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The Corporate Governance Industry 
Paul Rose* 
This Article considers the role of the corporate governance industry as a voluntary 
regulator. The corporate governance industry influences (and in some cases effectively 
controls) the votes of trillions of dollars of equity, and affects the governance policies 
and fortunes of thousands of companies through proxy voting recommendations and 
governance ratings. This Article considers the increasing influence of the corporate 
governance industry, and argues that potential conflicts of interest within some 
governance firms cast doubt on the reliability of their proxy advice and governance 
ratings. Additionally, governance firms may be overstepping their expertise in proxy 
voting decisions and in governance rating, in part because of their reliance on “good 
governance metrics” for which there is little evidentiary support. Finally, erroneous 
governance metrics (and indeed, a reliance on one-size-fits-all governance checklists) 
promoted by influential governance advisers not only affect important shareholder voting 
decisions and decisions on whether to invest in or divest from a particular company, but 
may also have a more general, harmful effect on corporate governance regulation. A 
number of academics have argued that federal expansion into corporate governance 
issues has significant negative consequences. Perhaps most importantly, Sarbanes-Oxley 
mandates specific governance policies rather than setting broad standards, thereby 
eliminating some vital flexibility in corporate governance. This Article argues that the 
corporate governance industry may have similarly harmful effects by pressuring 
companies to adopt a homogenized set of governance rules which may not be suited to 
the companies’ respective requirements. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
There is no specific set of corporate governance rules, standards, and principles to 
which every U.S. corporation must adhere. Rather, corporations are directed by a variety 
of sources, some public, some private, which develop and enforce governance rules. 
Several intertwined factors explain why we do not have a single rule set, source, and 
regulator of corporate governance. The first is our federalist system of government, 
which reserves to the states the powers not delegated to the federal government by the 
Constitution,1 and among the powers traditionally reserved to the states is the ability to 
charter and regulate corporations and other business forms.2 But while the states are the 
primary corporate regulators, state legislatures have left much of the substantive 
regulation of corporations to companies themselves by creating enabling rules that allow 
companies to fashion their own governance structures within a broad statutory 
framework.3 Roberta Romano has argued that the regulation of corporations primarily by 
states rather than federal regulators is the “genius” of American corporate law: states 
compete for incorporations and are thus incented to offer corporate codes that will appeal 
to businesses.4 Companies also have an incentive to self-regulate as a competitive 
response to limited available capital—like state regulators; companies will generally 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”). 
 2. Under modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence, however, the regulation of corporate governance 
issues would justifiably fall under federal jurisdiction, so it is largely due to both tradition and federal restraint 
that the federal government leaves much of the regulation of corporations to the states and other regulators, such 
as stock exchanges. 
 3. Because of the generally flexible nature of state corporate codes, much of the regulation of 
corporations by the states occurs not through statutes, but through statutory interpretation provided by state 
courts. See infra Part II.B. Perhaps the best-known example of this common law tradition of regulation is the 
“business judgment rule,” which holds that business decisions made in good faith and on the basis of reasonable 
investigation are not actionable. See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 781 (Ill. App. 1968) (holding 
that a decision not to play night games at Wrigley Field was not actionable); Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 
N.Y.S.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1976) (holding as not actionable a decision to forego tax savings in order 
to grant a dividend and thereby demonstrate an appearance of earnings). 
 4. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 1 (1993) (“The genius of American 
corporate law is in its federal organization.”). 
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attempt to encourage investment by offering an attractive corporate governance structure. 
In addition, as a condition to listing their securities on a stock exchange, public 
companies will subject themselves to exchange listing standards. Given that investors 
will often not have the time and resources to undertake a sophisticated analysis of a 
company’s governance structure, and recognizing that companies will often have 
competing incentives that may result in suboptimal governance structures, exchanges also 
regulate via listing standards that are designed to promote investor confidence by 
providing minimum standards for listed companies. The recognition by industry that 
regulators—even relatively restrained federal agencies like the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC)—abhor a regulatory vacuum also provides another motivation for 
self regulation.5 
After WorldCom, Enron, and the other turn-of-the-millennium financial scandals, 
this loose structure of federal/state/exchange and self regulation was regarded by many to 
be an unreliable motivator of adequate corporate governance. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 was one response to this perceived failure, and has since been the subject of 
considerable academic interest, not least because it federalized several areas of corporate 
law that had been left to the states or simply to the discretion of the board and 
management. Another response, which has received relatively little attention, is the 
increasing role of what this Article refers to as the “corporate governance industry”: 
governance advisers, governance rating firms, and proxy advisers (sometimes operating 
as business units of a single company).6 
The corporate governance industry plays a major corporate governance policy-
making role, and, because of its influence with institutional investors, effectively acts as a 
voluntary corporate regulator. Some executives believe that corporate governance 
industry market leader Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) may control a third or 
more of the shareholder votes.7 According to a recent interview reported in the 
Washington Post, John M. Connolly, president and chief executive of ISS, acknowledges 
that 15%-20% of ISS clients use a service that automatically votes according to ISS 
recommendations, although clients can override it.8 As a measure of influence, consider 
that ISS has over 1700 institutional clients, and the clients’ assets under management 
exceed $25 trillion.9 ISS claims to advise “24 of the top 25” and “81 of the top 100” 
mutual funds, all “25 of the top 25” asset managers, and “17 of the top 25” public 
pension funds.10 ISS advice has been cited as a decisive factor in a number of major 
corporate events, including the approval of the Hewlett-Packard/Compaq merger and the 
 
 5. The industry group Business Roundtable was created, among other reasons, to reduce “unwarranted 
intrusion by government into business affairs.” See Business Roundtable, About Us, 
http://www.businessroundtable.org/aboutUs/history.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2007). 
 6. As this Article argues below, however, the evolution of the corporate governance industry is only 
partly attributable to the scandals. 
 7. Dean Starkman, A Proxy Adviser’s Two Sides: Some Question Work of ISS for Companies It 
Scrutinizes, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2006, at D1 (citing a statement by Susan E. Wolf, vice president at Schering-
Plough Corp. and chairman of the Soc’y of Corporate Sec’ys and Governance Prof’ls). 
 8. Id. 
 9. See INST. S’HOLDER SERVS., THE BUSINESS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IS GLOBAL, 
http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/Locations.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2007). 
 10. See INST. S’HOLDER SERVS., EXPERIENCE MATTERS: A GUIDE TO SELECTING THE RIGHT PROXY 
VOTING PARTNERS 9 (2007), http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/GuidetoSelectingtheRightProxyVotingPartner.pdf. 
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shareholder vote that ousted Michael Eisner from his role of chairman at Walt Disney 
Co.11 Another measure of the growing importance of the industry is the fact that, just five 
years ago, market leader ISS was acquired for around $40 million.12 On November 1, 
2006, RiskMetrics acquired ISS for an estimated $550 Million.13 
The influence of ISS and other proxy advisers may increase even more with passage 
of rules by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), scheduled to take effect in January 
2008,14 which would eliminate broker discretionary voting in director elections.15 
According to Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz attorneys David Katz and Laura McIntosh, 
“an estimated 70 to 80 percent of all public companies’ shares are held in ‘street name’ . . 
. by brokers . . . [and] depositories . . .” on behalf of beneficial owners,16 and under 
NYSE rules brokers are given discretionary voting power over such shares only for 
“routine matters”;17 if the rules under consideration are enacted, uncontested elections 
would be considered “non-routine.” Katz and McIntosh argue that “[i]f, in the aftermath 
of NYSE rule changes as proposed, issuers indeed are unable to contact or obtain voting 
instructions from large numbers of individual shareholders, the effect will be a massive 
shift of voting power from brokers to institutions, and, therefore, to proxy advisory 
services such as ISS, Glass, Lewis & Co., and Proxy Governance.”18 As an indication of 
how this shifts power to the corporate governance industry, Katz and McIntosh note that 
a 2002 study found that “ISS recommended that shareholders vote against over 78 
percent of the proposals that the authors estimated to have been determined by broker 
discretionary votes.”19 While the general purpose of the new rule would be to increase 
shareholder power with respect to director elections,20 the influence of the corporate 
governance industry generally, and proxy advisers particularly, has prompted the NYSE 
to propose a formal SEC investigation into the role of these firms in the proxy process.21 
Given the industry’s tremendous influence over corporate governance and, more 
directly, the proxy voting mechanism that shapes corporate governance decision-making, 
 
 11. Starkman, supra note 7. For a recent discussion of ISS’ role in hedge fund activism, see Thomas 
Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund Activism: An Empirical Analysis, 32 J. CORP. L. 
(forthcoming 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=911072. 
 12. David S. Hilzenrath, Investor Advisor ISS Is Sold to RiskMetrics, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2006, at D1. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See Press Release, New York Stock Exch., NYSE Adopts Proxy Working Group Recommendation to 
Eliminate Broker Voting In 2008 (Oct. 24, 2006), available at 
http://www.nyse.com/press/1161166307645.html?sa_campaign=/rss/newsreleases/NYSE.comRuleProposalsNe
wsReleases. 
 15. See PROXY WORKING GROUP, NEW YORK STOCK EXCH., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE 
PROXY WORKING GROUP OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 21 (2006), 
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/REVISED_NYSE_Report_6_5_06.pdf [hereinafter NYSE PROXY REPORT]. 
 16. See id. at 10. 
 17. Giving Proxies by Member Organization, NEW YORK STOCK EXCH. REP. § 452 (2007). 
 18. DAVID A. KATZ & LAURA A. MCINTOSH, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A SEISMIC SHIFT IN THE 
MECHANICS OF ELECTING DIRECTORS 3 (2006), http://www.realcorporatelawyer.com/pdfs/wlrk072806_02. 
 19. Id. at 3 (citing Jennifer E. Bethel & Stuart L. Gillan, The Impact of the Institutional and Regulatory 
Environment on Shareholder Voting 2 (Ctr. for Corp. Governance, Working Paper No. 2002-002, 2002), 
available at http://www.lerner.udel.edu/ccg/research_files/CCGWP2002-2.pdf). 
 20. Katz and McIntosh note in this respect that brokers tend to vote as recommended by management. Id. 
at n.2. 
 21. See, e.g., NYSE PROXY REPORT, supra note 15, at 29. 
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it is imperative to scrutinize the manner in which this influence is exercised. It is also 
crucial to scrutinize the assumptions underlying the advice. Some observers, including 
Rep. Richard Baker (R-Louisiana), have raised concerns over potential conflicts of 
interest within some governance firms that cast doubt on the reliability of their proxy 
advice and governance ratings.22 ISS, for example, sells advice on proxy voting and sells 
corporate governance ratings, but it also provides advice to companies on how to improve 
their ratings.23 Because of ISS’ market power, Rep. Baker has argued that “conflicts of 
interest and a lack of competition in the industry could lead firms to provide biased 
advice,”24 and a study is currently being undertaken by the Government Accountability 
Office at his request.25 
Additionally, governance firms may be overstepping their expertise in proxy voting 
decisions,26 and in governance rating,27 in part because of their reliance on “good 
governance metrics,” for which there is little evidentiary support. Erroneous governance 
metrics (and indeed, a reliance on one-size-fits-all governance checklists) not only affect 
important shareholder decisions and decisions on whether to invest in or divest from a 
particular company, but may also have a more general, harmful effect on corporate 
governance regulation. A number of academics have argued that the federal expansion 
into certain corporate governance issues has significant negative consequences, including 
the loss of the competitive benefits provided by the market for incorporations;28 as 
opposed to a having a choice of relatively flexible enabling state laws, Sarbanes-Oxley 
requires companies to adopt several specific corporate governance policies rather than 
tailor their governance structures for their particular requirements. As I will argue below, 
the corporate governance industry may have similarly harmful effects on the competition 
for capital by pressuring companies to adopt a homogenized set of governance rules 
which may be ill-suited to the companies’ respective situations. 
 
 22. See Kaja Whitehouse, U.S. Legislator Seeks Report on Corporate Vote Consultants, DOW JONES 
NEWSWIRES, Oct. 5, 2006, http://www.djnewswires.com. 
 23. As discussed in Part II.B.1, infra, this is accomplished through an interactive web interface. 
 24. See Whitehouse, supra note 22. 
 25. Id. 
 26. ISS recently received criticism for its advice to reject Fifth Third Bank’s CEO, George A. Schaefer Jr., 
for reelection to the board: 
On Mar. 16, Richard X. Bove of investment bank Punk Ziegel & Co. fired off a research note 
calling ISS’ advice “totally inappropriate” and pointing out that Fifth Third's assets have increased 
tenfold since Schaefer took over in 1990. Nell Minow, a former president of ISS who now runs 
governance researcher The Corporate Library LLC, warns that ISS may create “incentive for 
earnings manipulation that may not be in the shareholders' long-term interest” -- precisely the sort 
of activity good governance is supposed to prevent. 
Emily Thornton, ISS Looks Like It's Channeling Icahn: The Proxy Advisory Firm Says Fifth Third's CEO 
Should Go Despite Stellar Governance, BUS. WEEK ONLINE, Apr. 3, 2006, 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_14/b3978031.htm?campaign_id=rss_magzn. 
 27. See Part III, infra, discussing the limitations of ISS and other advisers’ governance ratings 
methodology. 
 28. See, e.g., Larry Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 61 (2003) (arguing the case for new regulation in the wake of the 
Enron scandal “has not been made”); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack 
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1602 (2005) (examining Sarbanes-Oxley and concluding that it 
was misconceived and unlikely to improve performance). 
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This Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, I will provide a brief review of the 
existing federal, state, and exchange regulatory framework and how it has provided 
sufficient space for the corporate governance industry to grow into an increasingly 
influential and powerful voluntary regulator. I will then briefly describe the development 
of the corporate governance industry, and will describe the major firms in the corporate 
governance industry, which is composed of both non-profit and for-profit sectors. In Part 
III, I will focus on problematic methodologies and policies of certain corporate 
governance firms, with a view to how these methodologies and policies are influencing 
companies and corporate governance practices. In Part IV, I will offer some preliminary 
thoughts on whether the increasing power of the corporate governance industry should be 
constrained by the SEC. 
II. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDUSTRY 
A. The Development of the Corporate Governance Industry 
The development of the corporate governance industry has been dependent on two 
factors. The first is structural: the existing regulatory regimes affecting corporate 
governance are structured with sufficient regulatory space so that an industry providing 
corporate governance advice has room to grow, but regulatory space only provides an 
answer to how the corporate governance industry could develop. The second factor, 
market demand from institutional investors, explains why the corporate governance 
industry developed. 
1. The Structure of Corporate Governance Regulation 
Public company corporate governance regulation in the United States comes from 
both public and private sources. Public sources include, on a state level, legislatures and 
courts, and on the federal level, the SEC and, to a lesser extent, other federal agencies.29 
Since its inception, the SEC has often tested the bounds of its federal mandate to regulate 
merely the purchase and sale of securities.30 The SEC’s interest in corporate governance 
 
 29. For instance, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight and the Commodities Futures 
Trading Commission each prescribe governance structures and rules specific to the types of companies and 
industries they regulate. 
 30. For a comprehensive review of the SEC’s efforts to regulate corporate governance, see Roberta 
Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas-The Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge 
of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79 (2005). Besides the SEC’s efforts, the judicial branch has also 
indirectly set out limited governance rules. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines (FSG) set out general guidelines 
for corporate governance, with a particular emphasis on legal compliance, in a section called “Effective 
Compliance and Ethics Program.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f) (2006), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/2006guid/8c2_5.html. A corporation is allowed more leniency in white collar criminal 
matters if the corporation can show that it had an effective ethics and compliance program. Although as a result 
of the Booker and Blakely decisions the guidelines in the ethics and compliance program are viewed as 
“advisory” rather than “mandatory,” they are still viewed as authoritative guidance for companies wishing to 
minimize potential criminal liability risk. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 221 (2005) (holding that 
the federal sentencing guidelines are merely advisory provisions that recommend, rather than require, a 
particular sentencing range); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004) (holding that any fact, other than 
a prior conviction, that raises the penalty beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to the jury and 
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flows naturally from its mission to “protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient 
markets, and facilitate capital formation.”31 The SEC occasionally encourages exchanges 
to enact governance rules as a means to promote investor protection,32 and has also 
attempted more direct regulation of governance matters, although this typically takes 
place through disclosure regulation rather than explicit governance requirements. For 
example, SEC rules enacted pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley require specific management 
participation in the evaluation and certification of such internal controls.33 The internal 
controls requirements and, more specifically, the certification of the internal controls are 
in effect specific governance requirements.34 
When the SEC has attempted to enact governance reform without a specific 
congressional mandate, such as Sarbanes-Oxley, generally it has not fared well. The best 
known case is the 1990 decision Business Roundtable v. SEC.35 Business Roundtable 
dealt with an SEC rule requiring exchanges to bar the listing of a domestic corporation’s 
securities if the issuer “acted disparately” to reduce the per share voting rights of existing 
stockholders. The court pushed back against the SEC expansion into governance matters, 
finding that the rule “directly controlled the substantive allocation of powers among 
classes of shareholders,”36 and therefore exceeded the SEC’s authority under section 19 
of the 1934 Act.37 Although the ruling did not entirely eliminate the ability of the SEC to 
create governance rules with respect to proxy voting,38 the practical effect of the decision 
for future SEC efforts to regulate governance through listing standards is that SEC 
authority over corporate governance listing standards is reviewed on a case-by-case basis 
with respect to a specific congressional statutory purpose.39 
 
found beyond a reasonable doubt). See also Douglas A. Berman, Conceptualizing Blakely, 17 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 89, 93 (2004) (stating a dialogue on sentencing is overdue). 
 31. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market 
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Apr. 4, 
2007). 
 32. See infra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 33. Management’s Reports on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure 
in Exchange Act Periodic Rates, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-8238 & 34-47,986, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636 (June 
5, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8238.htm. 
 34. This has been especially true since the SEC began urging reporting companies to make use of the 
internal controls framework of the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 
(COSO). COSO has fairly specific oversight and governance mechanisms, which are more broadly applicable 
than simple financial reporting controls. See COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE TREADWAY COMM’N, 
INTERNAL CONTROL—INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK (1994). 
 35. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 36. Id. The court concluded the following:  
the Exchange Act cannot be understood to include regulation of an issue that is so far beyond 
matters of disclosure (such as are regulated under § 14 of the Act), and of the management and 
practices of self-regulatory organizations, and that is concededly a part of corporate governance 
traditionally left to the states.  
Id. at 408. 
 37. Id. at 406. 
 38. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19c-4, 69 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 565, 596-602 (1991) (examining the implications of Business Roundtable on the SEC’s regulations). 
 39. Special Study Group, Special Study on Market Structure, Listing Standards and Corporate 
Governance, 57 BUS. LAW. 1487, 1525 (2002). Relying in part on the authority of the Business Roundtable 
decision, industry recently pushed back an SEC proposal that would, under certain circumstances, require 
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Although Sarbanes-Oxley demonstrates that the federal government will enact 
corporate governance regulations when it deems them to be necessary (or, perhaps when 
it feels compelled to do so by public outcry), public corporate governance regulations 
have been and primarily continue to be within the province of state legislatures and, to a 
large degree, the state courts petitioned to interpret these regulations. State regulation, 
like exchange regulation, has developed in a kind of give-and-take with both exchange 
regulation and federal regulation, with perhaps more give than take. Indeed, as Mark Roe 
has argued, states in general, and Delaware in particular, essentially regulate within the 
limits granted by the federal government.40 As Professors Kahan and Rock have noted,41 
Delaware’s legislature has been strikingly absent in the recent corporate governance 
debates: “Delaware has been largely mute: no legislation; no rule-making; no criminal 
investigations; few headlines.”42 An explanation for this seeming lack of interest may be 
found in Delaware’s classical model of corporate law-making. Kahan and Rock note that 
Delaware corporate law is largely judge-made, and that Delaware’s statutory law is 
relatively narrow. Given that Delaware operates within a federalist system in which 
Delaware’s regulatory powers co-exist with, and can be constrained by, the powers of the 
federal government, Delaware seeks to maintain an “apolitical gloss” over its corporate 
law by effectively making law only when required to do so by litigants.43 Delaware’s 
 
companies to include in their proxy materials security holder nominees for election as director. See Letter from 
Henry A. McKinnell, Chairman, The Bus. Roundtable, to Jonathan Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 
22, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/s71903-381.pdf (providing a business 
organization’s view on the SEC’s “proposal to require companies to include shareholder nominees for director 
in company proxy materials under certain circumstances”). For a discussion of the suspect applicability of the 
Business Roundtable decision to the shareholder access proposal, see Jill E. Fisch, Professor of Law & Dir. Of 
the Center for Corp. Sec., and Fin. Law at Fordham Univ., Prepared Statement Before the SEC Roundtable 
Discussion on Proposed Security Holder Director Nomination Rules (March 12, 2004), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dir-nominations/fisch031204.pdf; Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Comment on the SEC 
Shareholder Access Proposal, 1 (Univ. of Cal., Los Angeles, Sch. of Law, Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 
03-22, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=470121; SHAREHOLDER ACCESS TO THE CORPORATE 
BALLOT (Lucian Bebchuk, ed. 2005). 
 40. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2498-99 (2005) (discussing 
Delaware’s corporate law in relation to the federal government); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 588, 590 (2003) (arguing the debate over whether states are racing to the bottom or top in 
corporate law governance is misconceived because of the federal government’s ability to govern issues of top 
importance). The most important federal constraint on state action is perhaps the National Securities Markets 
Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA), which fixed the SEC’s role as the regulator of offerings of nationally 
traded securities and securities of registered investment companies. Generally, however, NSMIA leaves states 
jurisdiction over traditional state roles, such as common law fraud actions and most corporate governance 
issues. 
 41. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 VAND. 
L. REV. 1573, 1574 (2005). 
 42. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Our Corporate Federalism and the Shape of Corporate Law 5 
(Univ. of Penn. Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 04-12, 2004),  available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=564685. 
 43.  
Faced with the recent corporate scandals, calls for action, and Sturm und Drang, Delaware reacted 
accordingly: Basically, it does nothing until cases are brought. Any more pro-active response by 
Delaware actors would have threatened to undermine the political legitimacy achieved by 
Delaware's commitment to the classical common law model. 
Id. 
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status as a front-runner in the incorporations race also explains why it does not attempt to 
innovate with respect to corporate governance regulation.44 
The most significant private constraints on public company corporate governance 
come from the exchanges on which the companies are listed. Indeed, most externally-
imposed corporate governance rules were first imposed not by the SEC or states, but by 
stock exchanges via exchange listing requirements. In the early 1900s, for example, the 
NYSE began requiring listed companies to distribute annual reports to investors and to 
hold annual meetings. While there has been some debate on the ability of exchanges to 
effectively regulate listed companies,45 exchanges continue to provide many substantive 
governance rules. However, the exchanges’ ability to regulate is limited by the SEC’s 
oversight of the exchanges. Despite their label of “self-regulatory organizations” (SROs), 
in practice the SROs operate under significant SEC supervision, and have done so since 
the inception of the Exchange Act. Congress expanded the SEC’s control over the SROs 
in 1975 by granting the SEC the ability to reject or amend SRO rule changes, including 
listing standards changes. Ordinarily, however, the SEC does not attempt to restrict the 
exchanges’ ability to add additional or more restrictive governance requirements on listed 
companies; rather, the SEC effectively restricts the exchanges’ latitude by pushing the 
exchanges to synchronize standards across the exchanges, when possible.46 The SEC also 
will press for higher and more restrictive standards as it deems necessary.47 
Despite the many regulators overseeing the governance of public companies—the 
SEC, states, and the exchanges—corporations still enjoy a great deal of flexibility in 
devising substantive rules and governance structures. With state and exchange corporate 
governance regulation, the lack of numerous mandatory rules is explained by market 
incentives: exchanges compete with one another for listings, while states compete with 
one another for incorporations. The result of this competition is a flexible set of 
 
 44. As Michael Abramowicz has argued, Delaware easily could mimic any corporate law innovation by 
another state, so it does not face any real competition from other states as far as corporate law is concerned 
(other states like Nevada may be attractive for other reasons, such as tax rates). Michael Abramowicz, Speeding 
up the Crawl to the Top, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 139, 157 (2003). 
 45. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan, Some Problems with Stock Exchange-Based Securities Regulation, 83 VA. L. 
REV. 1509, 1510-14 (1997) (addressing the proposition that regulatory authority should be applied to the stock 
exchanges); Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1454 (1997) (arguing benefits 
of mobile capital “will be better realized through regulatory decentralization than greater centralization”); A.C. 
Pritchard, Markets As Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges As Securities Fraud 
Enforcers, 33 SEC. L. REV. 255, 255-57 (2001) (originally published under the same title in 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 
925-27) (discussing reform aimed at class action lawsuits against corporations). 
 46. This effort was evident in the exchanges’ large-scale governance efforts in 2003, which culminated in 
revised listing standards for the NYSE and Nasdaq. The exchanges and the SEC worked together for months to 
finally arrive at a compromise on the form of the regulations to be set out in the listing standards, with the final 
NYSE and Nasdaq versions identical on essentially every point. 
 47. The SEC worked extensively with the NYSE and Nasdaq in formulating enhanced governance listing 
standards in November 2003. The new listing standards primarily deal with board composition, and include 
rules setting standards for board independence, as well as standards for audit, compensation, and governance 
committees. The NYSE and Nasdaq also require listed companies to disclose their corporate governance 
guidelines, which must discuss director qualification standards, director responsibilities, board access to 
management, director compensation, director orientation and continuing education, management succession, 
and annual performance evaluations of the board. For a discussion of the listing standards and a review of the 
rulemaking process, see NASD and NYSE Rulemaking: Relating to Corporate Governance, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-48,745, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154 (Nov. 4, 2003) (addressing the proposed rule change). 
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governance requirements, imposing very few mandatory governance procedures and 
structures. With respect to federal regulation of corporate governance, a traditional 
deference by Congress and the courts to state and exchange regulation of corporate 
governance matters (Sarbanes-Oxley notwithstanding) has limited SEC efforts to create 
substantive governance requirements. 
2. The Market for a Corporate Governance Industry 
Corporate governance inevitably receives attention and calls for its reinvention 
following upheavals in the financial markets. Although the corporate governance industry 
received a significant boost because of Enron and WorldCom, the seeds of the modern 
corporate governance industry were sown in the 1970s, in response to the corporate 
dimensions of the Watergate scandal. In response to the public outcry over Watergate and 
to ward off potential SEC regulation, the Business Roundtable (an executive industry 
group) began to address corporate governance issues by setting out best practices for 
public companies.48 Other prominent non-profit groups also developed and continue to 
provide governance guidelines, including the Council of Institutional Investors (CII) and 
the National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD). Although these groups often 
take similar positions on various corporate governance issues, they each act as policy 
vessels for management, institutional investors, and directors, respectively, and therefore 
sometimes differ in their recommendations. All of the positions taken by these groups are 
non-binding guidelines, and most of the guidance remains at a level of generality that 
allows for considerable flexibility in governance (e.g., “small boards often work more 
effectively than large boards,”49 says the Business Roundtable).50 In some cases, a group 
will take a more specific position; as might be expected, this is more often the case with 
the institutional investor mouthpiece, the CII. For instance, the CII recommends that all 
directors be elected annually, and that directors should be elected by a majority of the 
votes cast.51 
More recently, quasi-governmental and international industry groups such as the 
Organisation of Economic Co-opertation and Development (OECD) and the International 
Corporate Governance Network (ICGN)52 have offered best practices, policy positions, 
 
 48. “The executives who created the Roundtable believed that the U.S. economy would be healthier, there 
would be less unwarranted intrusion by government into business affairs, and the interest of the public would be 
better served if there were more cooperation and less antagonism.” Business Roundtable, Business Roundtable 
History, http://www.businessroundtable.org//aboutUs/history.aspx (last visited Apr. 3, 2007). 
 49. BUS. ROUNDTABLE, BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 13 (2005) 
[hereinafter BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE GUIDELINES]. 
 50. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF INST. INVESTORS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICY (2006), 
http://www.cii.org/policies/2006%20(April)%20CII%20Policies%20(2).pdf [hereinafter CII GUIDELINES]. CII 
states that the guidelines are structures that CII “has found to be appropriate in most situations.” Id. at 2. 
Business Roundtable is careful to note that “no one structure is right for every corporation.” BUSINESS 
ROUNDTABLE GUIDELINES, supra note 49, at 15. 
 51. CII GUIDELINES, supra note 50, at 2. 
 52. The non-binding OECD Corporate Governance Principles are designed to complement any applicable 
legal requirement—they are what the OECD sees as “best practices” for multinational companies, rather than 
legal rules that could conflict with state or federal law. For a comparison between these guidelines and the 
OECD guidelines, see Kathryn Gordon, The OECD Guidelines (for Multinational Enterprises) and Other 
Corporate Responsibility Instruments: A Comparison (OECD Working Paper on Int’l Inv., No. 2001/5, 2001), 
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and other kinds of soft law in an effort to develop common standards of adequate 
governance that will, among other benefits, encourage cross-border investment.53 
Perhaps more significantly, the rise of the modern corporate governance movement 
is tied to the increasing importance of the institutional investor. In 1965, institutional 
investors held 16% of U.S. equities; by 2001, institutional investors held 61%.54 The 
increasing numbers of institutional investors meant a lucrative, developing market for 
corporate governance advisers. A corporate governance adviser may be able to conduct 
research relatively cheaply, and spread its costs across hundreds of institutional clients. 
ISS, for instance, has been known to use relatively unskilled temporary employees to 
conduct governance reviews, which focus on publicly-filed SEC disclosure documents.55 
Unless an institutional investor believes that it can conduct research for less, or that more 
expensive but discerning research will enable it to obtain better returns (after subtracting 
its own research costs), the investor may be better off outsourcing its corporate 
governance research. Additionally, given the huge amount of information that is available 
on issuers, through news media, sell-side analysts, and Internet sources, and the speed at 
which information is disseminated, it is not surprising that institutional investors would 
seek to outsource some of their research load. 
The link between institutional investors and the corporate governance industry was 
also strengthened by an increasing regulatory focus on proxy voting. In the 1990s the 
Department of Labor advised pension funds that proxy voting constituted part of the 
funds’ fiduciary duties to investors.56 In 2003, the SEC enacted rules requiring mutual 
fund managers to vote proxies in the best interests of clients, and also required disclosure 
of voting policies and actual votes.57 
Shareholders have long attempted to exercise influence through precatory 
 
available at http://oecd.org/dataoecd/46/36/2075173.pdf. The ICGN, however, is generally more specific in its 
requirements than the OECD, which may produce conflict with certain state or exchange standards. However, in 
most cases the ICGN standards simply represent a higher standard than most countries require, and opting for a 
higher standard is generally not prohibited by governance regulators. For a brief discussion of the differences 
between the OECD guidelines and the ICGN guidelines, see Int’l Corp. Governance Network, ICGN Statement 
on Global Corporate Governance Principles, 
http://www.icgn.org/organisation/documents/cgp/revised_principles_jul2005.php (last visited Apr. 3, 2007) 
[hereinafter ICGN Statement]. Other significant international corporate governance guidelines, as cited by the 
OECD, include the following: the Caux Principles for Business; the Global Reporting Initiative; Global 
Sullivan Principles; the Principles for Global Corporate Responsibility: Benchmarks; Social Accountability 
8000 (SA 8000); and the United Nations Global Compact. 
 53. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL 
ENTERPRISES (rev. 2000), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf. 
 54. SECS. INDUS. ASS’N, SECURITIES INDUSTRY FACTBOOK 64 (2002), 
http://www.sia.com/research/pdf/2002Fact_Book.pdf. 
 55. Eleanor Laise, Is This the Most Influential Man on Wall Street?, SMARTMONEY MAG., Oct. 16, 2002, 
http://www.smartmoney.com/mag/index.cfm?story=oct02-influential. 
 56. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2 (2006). 
 57. See Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2106, 68 Fed. Reg. 
6585 (Feb. 7, 2003) (adopting Investment Advisers Act Rule 206(4)-6, 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-6 (2006)); 
Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management Investment 
Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8188, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564 (Feb. 7, 2003) (adopting Investment Company 
Act Rule 30b1-4, 17 C.F.R. § 270.30b1-4 (2006), and related amendments to the applicable Investment 
Company Act forms). 
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shareholder resolutions,58 and these resolutions are still one of the primary means for 
shareholders to influence corporate governance. However, shareholder-led governance 
movements struggle against collective action problems—shareholders generally will not 
make an effort to effect governance changes unless the benefits resulting from the efforts 
equal or exceed the costs of such an effort. Even when such efforts are made, the benefits 
may only inure to a particular shareholder or a small group of shareholders.59 However, 
the corporate governance industry, primarily through the proxy voting process, is able to 
present a relatively cohesive front to management and the board of directors. ISS, by 
influencing perhaps a third or more of a company’s securities, may be the de facto voice 
of the institutional investor.60 
B. The For-Profit Governance Industry: Proxy Advisers, Governance Ratings Agencies, 
and Governance Advisers 
The for-profit corporate governance industry sells corporate governance advice 
through a number of products, including corporate governance ratings and proxy advice. 
Corporate governance ratings companies affect governance decisions in at least two 
ways. First, governance policies are necessarily built into the rating company’s analysis. 
Rather than advocating specific governance policies, governance ratings agencies affect 
corporate governance simply by rewarding or penalizing various corporate governance 
policies. Because many institutional investors, including large pension funds, use the 
governance ratings to decide whether or not to invest in or divest from a company, 
companies must pay attention to the ratings. 
As noted above, proxy advisory work helped drive the initial development of the 
corporate governance industry. ISS, the market leader, provides both governance ratings 
and proxy voting recommendations. Proxy advisers generally base their decisions on 
corporate governance standards that are derived from the same policies as those used to 
formulate governance ratings and related governance advice. Because of the influence 
proxy advisers like ISS have with institutional investors (and, as discussed below, given 
that they are in some cases directly empowered by clients to vote shares according to 
their policies), proxy advisers play a more direct role in effecting corporate governance 
changes than firms that only rate governance. 
There are about a half-dozen well-established firms in the U.S. corporate 
governance industry, and a few others who operate in Asia and Europe.61 The following 
 
 58. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2006). 
 59. This is one of the concerns with the recent spate of hedge fund activism. While hedge funds may seek 
to encourage governance changes that benefit shareholders generally, hedge fund interests may not always 
coincide with other shareholders’ interests to the extent that hedge funds have a different investment horizon. 
See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control (Univ. 
of Penn. Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 06-16, 2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=919881. 
 60. For a discussion of the influential role of the ISS as a proxy adviser, see Briggs, supra note 11, at 14-
15. 
 61. The significant U.S. market players include: the Corporate Library and its subsidiary, Board Analyst; 
Glass Lewis; GovernanceMetrics International; ISS; Proxy Governance, Inc.; and the credit rating agencies, 
Egan-Jones, Moody’s Inc. and Standard & Poor’s. European governance service providers include 
CoreRatings/DNV and Deminor Ratings. Asian governance providers include CRISIL Ltd. (India) Governance 
and Value Creation Ratings and ICRA Limited. 
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sections will focus attention on the policies of the most prominent U.S. proxy advisers 
and governance ratings firms. 
1. Institutional Shareholder Services 
ISS is the dominant firm in the corporate governance industry, and ISS affects 
corporate governance decisions in several ways. The major portion (65%) of ISS’ 
business is proxy advisory services.62 As a proxy adviser (generally to institutional 
investors, such as mutual funds), ISS reviews the various company and shareholder 
proposals put up for a vote at the annual election of shareholders of various companies. 
ISS will analyze the proposal and offer advice on how the advisee should vote, although 
in some cases the client empowers ISS to vote on its behalf in accordance with ISS 
recommendations. Because ISS has such a large clientele, both in terms of the number of 
institutional and other investors that it represents, as well as in terms of the market 
capitalization held by these investors, ISS’ recommendations may make the difference 
between success and failure of a proposal. 
While ISS’ core business is built around a standard “best practices” proxy advisory 
service, it also offers specialized proxy advice for clients interested in effecting social 
responsibility initiatives63 (Social Advisory Services), for public funds that would like to 
be active “on issues like majority vote standard, classified boards, performance-based 
equity awards, voting power dilution, ratification of auditors, corporate social 
responsibility, terrorism states and other matters impacting the public good”64 (Public 
Fund Advisory Services), and for clients who have a fiduciary obligation to protect plan 
assets as required by the U.S. Department of Labor and the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 197465 (Taft-Hartley Advisory Services). ISS also offers customizable 
proxy voting services,66 M & A analysis services,67 and international proxy voting 
services.68 Additionally, ISS sells “non-recommendation research” on various social69 
and international issues70 for clients that analyze proxies on a case-by-case basis. 
Another component of ISS’ business model is its corporate governance ratings 
service. Since 2002, ISS has rated companies with a proprietary analysis that results in a 
 
 62. See ISS’ disclosure on Form ADV (Uniform Application for Investment Adviser Registration), 
available at http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/NewFormADVII.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2007). 
 63. Inst. S’holder Servs., Social Advisory Services, 
http://www.issproxy.com/institutional/research/sirsresearch.jsp (last visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
 64. Inst. S’holder Servs., Public Fund Advisory Services, 
http://www.issproxy.com/institutional/research/publicfund.jsp (last visited Apr. 3, 2007). 
 65. Inst. S’holder Servs., Taft-Hartley Advisory Services, 
http://www.issproxy.com/institutional/research/tafthartleyresearch.jsp (last visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
 66. Inst. S’holder Servs., Custom Proxy Advisory Services, 
http://www.issproxy.com/institutional/research/customresearch.jsp (last visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
 67. Inst. S’holder Servs., M&A Insight, http://www.issproxy.com/institutional/research/mainsight.jsp (last 
visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
 68. Inst. S’holder Servs., Int’l Proxy Advisory Services, 
http://www.issproxy.com/institutional/research/globalresearch.jsp (last visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
 69. Inst. S’holder Servs., Social Advisory Services, 
http://www.issproxy.com/institutional/research/socialissues.jsp (last visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
 70. Inst. S’holder Servs., US and Int’l Governance Research Services, 
http://www.issproxy.com/institutional/research/globalgovernanceresearch.jsp (last visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
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“Corporate Governance Quotient” (CGQ) for the company. ISS gathers relevant 
company information primarily from SEC filings, although in some instances ISS will 
obtain information directly from the company. The variables are structured so that they 
can be analyzed through simple “yes” or “no” indicators (or, in some cases, simply “not 
disclosed), i.e., “the Company has made a material restatement to year-end financial 
results during the past 24 months for any prior period.”71 
The CGQ currently covers approximately 7500 companies and is based on 
approximately 65 criteria for U.S. companies and 55 criteria for non-U.S. companies.72 
The variables ISS uses to analyze companies fall under four general governance areas: 
board, compensation, anti-takeover, and audit. ISS has weighted the variables of each 
category according to their importance to governance so that the variables under the 
“board” category make up 40% of the CGQ score, and the variables under the 
“compensation,” “anti-takeover,” and “audit” categories make up 30%, 20%, and 10% of 
the CGQ, respectively. Although the exact variables (and how they are weighted) are 
proprietary, ISS has disclosed the eight most important variables in the CGQ in terms of 
their effect on the overall CGQ score: 
1. The audit committee is comprised totally of independent outsiders. 
2. The average annual burn rate [which measures a company’s annual cost of 
granting equity to executives and employees] over the past three fiscal years is 
2% or less, or is within one standard deviation of the industry mean. 
3. All of the audit committee members are “financial experts,” based on the 
SEC definition of “financial expert”. 
4. Board is controlled by a supermajority of over 90% independent outsiders. 
5. Board has only one non-independent director. 
6. Directors are subject to stock ownership requirements. 
7. Board is controlled by a supermajority of between 75%-90% independent 
outsiders. 
8. Company is incorporated in a state without any state anti-takeover 
provisions.73 
From time to time ISS will review the CGQ factors and add, eliminate, or change 
the value and interrelationships of various factors.74 In June 2005, ISS announced an 
 
 71. INST. S’HOLDER SERVS., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE QUOTIENT METHODOLOGY UPDATE FACT SHEET 
(2006), http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/CGQFactSheet.pdf [hereinafter CGQ UPDATE]. 
 72. A very basic description of these criteria may be found at INST. S’HOLDER SERVS., EXPLAINING THE 
CGQ METHODOLOGY CHANGE PROCESS (2005), 
http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/CGQevolvingmethodologyWP.pdf [hereinafter CGQ METHODOLOGY]. A more 
detailed listing of the variables (which have been updated as of June 21, 2005) may be found in Renna 
Aggarwal & Rohan Williamson, Did New Regulations Target the Relevant Corporate Governance Attributes? 
32 (Geo. Univ. Working Paper Series, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=859264. 
 73. CGQ METHODOLOGY, supra note 72. 
 74. ISS explains that the revision of its latest CGQ variables was spurred on by the growing body of 
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increased focus on executive compensation issues and has added new variables to reflect 
“new requirements [e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley related requirements], emerging best practices 
and their correlation to financial performance.”75 ISS’ research also led it to revise a 
number of variables “to better clarify their impact on financial performance,”76 and ISS 
has eliminated six variables, either because, according to ISS, no evidence indicates that a 
particular variable has any effect on firm performance, or because new regulations have 
 
research that has attempted to find a link between corporate governance and firm performance: 
A team of ISS quantitative analysts built on the work of numerous researchers. . . . An outcome of 
the research review and analysis, in addition to 4,000 statistical tests run against financial metrics, 
resulted in addition, modification or elimination of CGQ variables. . . . The ISS Quantitative 
Analysis team used an exhaustive “bottoms up” approach to assess the rating variables, reviewing 
governance data from 2002 through 2004. For each year’s data, each rating issue was statistically 
tested against each of 16 performance measures that address profitability (ROIC, ROE, ROI, 
EBITDA margin, etc.); valuation (Price to Book, Cash Flow, and Earnings); market (TSR, 
Tobin’s Q); and, risk (Volatility and Z Score). In all, more than 4,000 statistical tests were run 
over the two-year evaluation period. 
 The goal of the revised methodology was to align the rating variables with objective 
performance measures. The underlying weights, or points, were then determined by the degree of 
correlation between each factor and the various performance measures. Specifically, the higher 
the rating factor correlation is to the performance measures, the relatively higher weight it has 
been allocated in the revised methodology. Conversely, the lower the rating factor correlation 
significance is to the performance metrics, the lower the weight assigned to that factor. The end 
result is a revised group of variables whose weightings are based on those most closely correlated 
with business outcomes. 
Id. at 1-3 (emphasis omitted). As I discuss below, the reliability of ISS’ variables as a predictor of good 
governance are the subject of significant debate. 
 75. Id. These variables include: related party transactions, other than the CEO (evaluates whether there are 
related party transactions with directors or officers other than the CEO); financial expert (analyzes the number 
of financial experts on the audit committee); performance-based compensation (awards points to companies that 
grant awards based on performance criteria and disclosed hurdle rates, i.e., companies that grant indexed 
options or awards not earned or vested unless specific performance measures are met are rewarded in this 
category); individual director performance reviews (awards points to companies that perform periodic 
performance reviews of individual directors); mandatory holding periods for options and restricted stock 
(awards points to companies that require their executives to retain a meaningful portion of their earned 
restricted shares or performance shares for a specified period after exercise or after the stock awards vest); 
takeover defenses (awards points for companies that do not have a poison pill); and capital structure (awards 
points to companies that are not authorized to issue blank check preferred stock). 
 76. Id. These revised variables include: board composition (awards points when at least two-thirds of 
board members are independent outsiders); number of boards served on, other than CEO (this variable was 
expanded to include three categories of board service of outsiders, presumably taking into consideration the fact 
that, for example, service as an audit committee member is more demanding than simply serving as a board 
member without committee responsibilities); chairman/CEO separation (awards points to companies that have 
separated the roles of chairman and CEO and have an independent director serving as chairman); governance 
guidelines (awards points for putting the company’s governance guidelines on the company web site); audit fees 
(awards points for additional detail on audit fees); capital structure—dual class (reduces the penalty for dual 
class capital structures where anyone can buy shares of the super-voting stock); option repricing (incorporates 
recent updates to NYSE and NASDAQ listing standards that option repricing may not be implemented without 
shareholder approval unless a company’s option plans specifically permit repricing); director education (awards 
points if directors attended accredited programs within previous two years); and key committee independence 
and board access to advisers (awards points when committees are independent and the board has access to its 
own advisers). 
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made a variable superfluous. The superfluous variables that have been eliminated include 
variables analyzing the disclosure of a policy on auditor rotation, the company’s history 
of option repricing, pension plans for non-employee directors, and corporate loans to 
insiders.77 ISS dropped variables relating to director term limits and mandatory 
retirement ages because it could find no link between these variables and financial 
performance or risk.78 
In November 2006, ISS again adjusted the CGQ to “better reflect current market 
trends in corporate governance, as well as more closely align with overall ISS policies.”79 
ISS now analyzes “the presence and strength of a majority vote standard for members of 
a company’s board of directors,”80 penalizes companies that restate financials, penalizes 
companies that have had to make a material restatement to year-end financial results for 
any period and/or who have been subject to an enforcement action as a result of options 
backdating,”81 and penalizes companies if one or more of its directors have been the 
subject of an ISS withhold voting recommendation for either the most recent annual 
meeting or the next annual meeting.82 ISS also modified existing ratings criteria, 
including changes to award points if a company with a classified board has passed a 
proposal to de-classify the board, but where all directors are not yet elected annually,83 
and to award points if a company has a combined chairman and CEO, “but where there is 
a counterbalancing governance structure in place.”84 ISS has deleted options expensing 
as a ratings criterion because “it has become obsolete as a result of regulation, and is no 
longer a differentiator of companies within the model.”85 
Finally, another component of ISS’ business is its advisory services to companies. 
The CGQ is provided to institutional investor clients, but it is also available to the subject 
companies. Subject companies may, in ISS’ words, “use CGQ dynamically to evaluate 
their governance structures, benchmark their governance performance and conduct peer 
analysis.”86 The “dynamic” use refers to a subject company’s ability to, for a fee, use 
ISSue Blueprint, a corporate governance analytic tool that allows companies to compare 
governance standards to peers and against “best practices.”87 Through the web interface, 
a client company may input various governance changes to test how the change would 
impact the company’s CGQ. Essentially, the client clicks a box indicating that its 
directors receive annual education and training on their responsibilities, for example, and 
the CGQ score increases. Combine the roles of chairman and CEO and the CGQ 
decreases. 
ISS also offers a separate tool for compensation plans—ISSue Compass—which 
similarly uses a web interface to allow a company the opportunity to test a provision with 
ISS before submitting it to shareholders for approval in the proxy statement. A client 
 
 77. Id. at 4. 
 78. Id. 
 79. CGQ UPDATE, supra note 72, at 1. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 2. 
 84. CGQ UPDATE, supra note 72, at 2. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See CGQ METHODOLOGY, supra note 72. 
 87. Id. 
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company can thus know whether or not ISS will support the compensation plan when ISS 
is asked for its recommendation. 
2. GovernanceMetrics International 
GovernanceMetrics International (GMI) provides corporate governance ratings and 
reports on nearly 4000 companies in the United States and abroad.88 It does not offer 
proxy advisory services. GMI uses almost 500 data points in assessing a company’s 
corporate governance. The result of the GMI analysis is a GMI rating report, which 
includes a summary of the company’s overall governance score, as well as a discussion 
and individual score for each of six governance broad categories: board accountability, 
corporate social responsibility, executive compensation, financial disclosure and internal 
controls, takeover controls and ownership base, and shareholder rights. 
GMI has developed its ratings by examining SEC regulations, exchange listing 
requirements, and many of the sources of corporate governance guidelines discussed 
above, including the OECD, the ICGN, and the Business Roundtable. Like ISS, GMI has 
produced a set of variables that are structured so that they can only produce “yes,” “no,” 
or “not disclosed” answers, which GMI believes eliminates “a large degree of 
subjectivity.”89 GMI obtains its information primarily through public documents and 
filings. After the initial report is completed, it is sent on to the company for a final 
accuracy check. GMI uses a proprietary scoring algorithm, which uses asymmetric, 
geometric scoring that results in the magnification of “outliers,” so that companies with 
the best practices are rewarded even more, while those with the worst practices are 
subject to additional penalties. 
3. The Corporate Library 
Another major corporate governance analysis firm, the Corporate Library, was 
founded by former ISS executives Nell Minow and Robert Monks. Generally speaking, 
the Corporate Library’s analysis is less quantitative and more qualitative than ISS’ or 
GMI’s analyses.90 While the Corporate Library does produce some numeric ratings based 
on the adherence of a company to a set of enumerated “best practices” (which are based 
primarily on the OECD’s model),91 the company also notes in its analysis that the “one-
size-fits-all aspects of the best practices compliance approach [is] limited at best.”92 As a 
result, the Corporate Library does not use the best practices benchmark as a component 
of its analysis of the board’s effectiveness; indeed, the Corporate Library notes that it has 
“assigned very low Board Effectiveness Ratings to a number of boards that rate quite 
well on best practices compliance. Such was the case with the disastrous Enron board, for 
 
 88. See GovernanceMetrics Int’l, Overview, 
http://www.gmiratings.com/(hgwaa055h0jyiu55scbird45)/About.aspx#top (last visited Apr. 3, 2007). 
 89. GovernanceMetrics Int’l, Research Methodology, 
http://www.gmiratings.com/(hgwaa055h0jyiu55scbird45)/About.aspx#methodology (last visited Apr. 3, 2007). 
 90. For an example of a Corporate Library analysis, see its analysis of OMX, CORP. LIBRARY, 
OFFICEMAX INCORPORATED CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROFILE (2006), 
http://www.thecorporatelibrary.com/special/misc/OfficeMax.pdf. 
 91. Id. at 8 (evaluating OMX with respect to a list of “best practices”). 
 92. Id. 
 DRAFT OF 7/19/2007 
118 The Journal of Corporation Law [Summer 
example, the clearest possible confirmation of the notion that best practice compliance 
alone is simply not enough.”93 
4. Glass, Lewis & Co. 
Glass, Lewis & Co. (Glass Lewis) provides research and advisory services to 
institutional investors through a number of products. Glass Lewis does not provide 
consulting services to rated companies “except in the rare circumstance that a money 
manager is a public company or a division of a public company.”94 Glass Lewis will 
provide copies of its previously published research to rated companies, sometimes for a 
fee.95 
Like ISS, Glass Lewis provides proxy advisory services to institutional investors. It 
also provides governance research, although its analyses are generally subjective and do 
not result in numerical governance ratings.96 One exception is the Glass Lewis product 
“Board Accountability Index” (BAI). The BAI includes all companies in the S&P 500 
and indexes all S&P 500 companies through a modified market-cap weighting algorithm 
that adjusts a company’s weight based on the presence or absence of five “critical 
corporate governance features.”97 The BAI is based on research conducted by Professors 
Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Allen Ferrell and focuses on five entrenchment 
factors that, according to their research, indicate a “statistically significant and strong 
correlation, over a long period of time” with stock performance.98 
5. Proxy Governance, Inc. 
One relatively new corporate governance industry firm, Proxy Governance, Inc., a 
proxy adviser, has determined to differentiate itself from ISS by offering a more 
subjective analysis—an “issue-by-company” approach, rather than an “issue-by-issue” 
approach: 
Instead of reviewing proxies and recommending votes on an issue-by-issue 
basis, PROXY Governance conducts its analysis and provides 
recommendations on an “issue-by-company” basis. It views proxy issues in the 
context of company-specific metrics, taking into account a variety of relevant 
factors, such as an individual company’s financial performance relative to its 
industry, its business environment, the strength of its management and 
corporate strategy, and the quality of its corporate governance, among others.99 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. See Glass, Lewis & Co. (Glass Lewis), Conflicts of Interest Disclosure, 
http://www.glasslewis.com/company/disclosure.php (last visited Apr. 3, 2007). 
 95. Id. 
 96. For a sample Glass Lewis research report, see  Glass, Lewis & Co., In-Depth Analysis of 
Unrecognized Risks, http://glasslewis.com/downloads/overviews/yellowcard.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2007). 
 97. Glass, Lewis, & Co., Board Accountability Index, http://www.glasslewis.com/solutions/bai.php (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2007). 
 98. Id. These factors include: staggered boards, limits on shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, 
golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers. Id. 
 99. Proxy Governance, Inc., Recommendations on an Issue-By-Company Basis, 
http://www.proxygovernance.com/content/pgi/content/issue_by_issue.shtml (last visited Apr. 3, 2007) 
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Proxy Governance also states that “[m]uch proxy analysis today is based on 
methodology that assumes a specific set of corporate governance initiatives is or is not 
inherently beneficial to shareholders, and that a specific conclusion regarding a particular 
issue should be applied ‘across-the-board’ to the voting of all corporations’ proxies.”100 
The company notes that a “‘one-size-fits-all’ approach may result in poor decisions 
on issues that genuinely impact long-term shareholder value.”101 As I will discuss below, 
this method has significant advantages over a “one-size-fits-all” approach, although such 
an approach is undoubtedly more time-consuming and costlier. 
 
  6. Morningstar, Egan-Jones and other Credit Ratings Agencies 
Morningstar, the mutual fund ratings firm,102 has also produced a new “Stewardship 
Grade” for stocks.103 The grade is derived from three broad criteria: “transparency” 
(accounting practices and overall financial disclosure); “shareholder friendliness” (such 
as the presence of insider-controlled share classes, takeover defenses, combined 
CEO/chairman role, and related-party transactions); and “incentives, ownership, and 
overall stewardship” (compensation and whether the subject firms have “consistently 
treated shareholders with respect, and which we think will continue to do so.”)104 The 
Stewardship Grades are absolute, rather than relative with respect to an industry peer 
group. 
Credit ratings firms Egan Jones and Standard & Poor’s (S&P) have also entered the 
corporate governance business. Egan-Jones has a stand-alone proxy advisory business, 
Egan-Jones Proxy Services, which, like Proxy Governance, does not adhere to a “one-
size-fits-all” policy.  While stating that “[v]oting recommendations generally follow 
along prescribed voting guidelines”, the firm also notes that “each proxy proposal is 
unique and is given individual attention by our research staff. We do not vote according 
to a book of voting principles enumerating a canned predetermined response to every 
possible situation without respect to the specifics at hand." 105    
S&P produces a “Corporate Governance Score” for S&P 500 companies, which 
covers approximately 100 criteria in four main categories: ownership structure, 
shareholder rights and stakeholder relations, disclosure and audit issues, and board 
structure and effectiveness.106 S&P also provides tailored research as requested by its 
clients. S&P’s share of the corporate governance market is rather low. Two other major 
credit ratings agencies, Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. and Fitch Ratings Ltd., also 
 
(emphasis omitted). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Morningstar has also produced governance ratings for mutual funds. See Kristen French, Morningstar 
Does Its Part for Corporate Governance Reform, FINANCIAL-PLANNING.COM, May 24, 2004, 
http://www.financial-planning.com/pubs/fpi/20040527104.html. 
 103. Pat Dorsey, Introducing Stewardship Grade for Stocks: Find Shareholder-Friendly Firms with Our 
New Grading System, MORNINGSTAR.COM, Feb. 7, 2005, 
http://news.morningstar.com/article/article.asp?id=126900&_QSBPA=Y. 
 104. Id. 
 105. EGAN JONES PROXY SERVICES, ABOUT OUR SERVICES, (2007) http://www.ejproxy.com/services.aspx.. 
 106. STANDARD & POOR’S, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SCORES - CRITERIA, METHODOLOGY AND 
DEFINITIONS (2002), 
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/us/page.article/2,1,1,0,1021558139012.html. 
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analyze corporate governance as part of their overall credit rating services but do not 
currently offer stand-alone governance ratings services. 
III. CONCERNS WITH THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDUSTRY 
There are three broad areas of concern with business practices in the corporate 
governance industry (though not all firms in the industry exhibit each of these problems). 
First, a number of commentators have expressed concern over the potential for conflicts 
if governance analysts also serve as governance consultants. Second, ISS and some of its 
competitors impose on companies (through proxy recommendations or through ratings 
pressure) a number of governance standards for which there is limited or no evidentiary 
support and in some cases may be inversely correlated with improved firm 
performance.107 
A third and related concern is that, to the extent that the particular best practices 
amount to a “one-size-fits-all” model, the board and management are effectively denied 
the ability to experiment with various governance structures in accordance with their 
corporate governance roles. In this sense, the corporate governance industry may, by 
discouraging tailored or innovative governance structures, reduce some of the 
competitive benefits made possible by a flexible and enabling regulatory structure. I 
discuss each of these concerns below. 
A. Conflicts of Interest 
A few governance advisers, and ISS in particular, have also been criticized because 
of perceived conflicts of interest.108 The concern stems from ISS’ advisory work for both 
the subject company and the company’s shareholders.109 This concern has two roots. 
First, ISS is providing both governance ratings and advice on how to improve the 
governance score—the governance adviser administering the test will also provide the 
answer key to those willing to purchase it. Observers have wondered whether this allows 
companies to effectively “game” the governance ratings, so long as they are willing to 
pay the price of the service.110 
Second, in the case of ISS, the governance adviser also serves as a proxy adviser, 
which creates a concern that ISS’ recommendation in a proxy matter may be affected by 
whether or not the subject company purchases other services from ISS, such as 
governance advice. Both of these potential conflicts of interest bear some similarities to 
the role (now reduced, but not wholly eliminated, by Sarbanes-Oxley) played by 
accounting firms as both auditors and advisers. In the case of auditors and governance 
advisers, an outside firm retained to provide an independent analysis of the subject 
company has built into its business model the provision of other services to the subject 
 
 107. See, e.g., infra note 128 and accompanying text. It does not seem unreasonable to assume that ISS or 
one of its competitors could make such an error because, among other possible reasons, it relied on inadequate 
research or because, for whatever reason, it promoted a social responsibility issue as a governance issue. 
 108. See, e.g., Starkman, supra note 7. 
 109. As discussed in Part II.B.1, supra, ISS has created separate business units for its corporate and 
investor advisory businesses in an effort to reduce potential conflicts. 
 110. See Troy Wolverton, A Warning About eBay's Options ‘Giveaway,’ THESTREET.COM, June 16, 2003, 
http://www.thestreet.com/stocks/troywolverton/10093761.html. 
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company. Certainly, the nature and regulation of public company audits is much different 
from governance rating. For example, public company auditors are retained by the 
company (under the direction of the audit committee and with approval of the 
shareholders), whereas governance ratings are initiated by governance ratings companies 
and paid for by interested shareholders. However, even if corporate governance firms are 
not retained by the subject company to provide governance ratings, the fact that the 
subject companies may retain the governance ratings agency for other services (such as 
compensation plan advice) creates a potential conflict of interest. By using objective 
measures, however, a governance rating agency may more plausibly claim that its 
governance analysis is not affected by the provision of other services. The persistence of 
objective measures, despite their dubious reliability as a measure of adequate corporate 
governance, thus may be explained as a defensive structure against such a conflict of 
interest, or at least as a defense against claims of such a conflict. 
The potential for conflicts where a company serves as both adviser and rater has not 
been missed by the largest consumers of corporate governance advice: large, institutional 
investors, including pension funds, have raised concerns and, in some cases, switched 
advisers over conflicts issues. For example, Missouri’s $8 billion pension fund ended its 
relationship with ISS because it decided it would rather do business with “an organization 
that at least has the appearance of undivided loyalty to . . . clients.”111 Likewise, Ohio’s 
$69 billion and Colorado’s $34 billion public employees’ retirement systems chose ISS 
rival Glass Lewis over ISS in part because Glass Lewis appeared to be “free from any 
appearance of conflict,”112 while ISS may have been compromised by “actual or 
perceived conflicts due to corporate consulting.”113 
B. Governance Ratings Methodologies 
This section focuses on the ratings methodologies used by ISS, GMI, and other 
governance advisers and reviews recent literature that considers whether the evidence 
matches up with the advice provided by the corporate governance industry. Many of the 
concerns raised here will also be applicable to proxy advisory work, given that a firm 
providing both proxy advice and governance ratings will align both on a common set of 
governance policies (although, as noted above, ISS clients may opt for customized proxy 
advice).114 ISS may decline to vote in favor of a director, for example, because the board 
did not adopt a shareholder resolution that received a majority vote of the shareholders, 
or because the director nominee serves on more than six public company boards.115 Note, 
 
 111. Starkman, supra note 7 (citing Letter from Gary Findlay, Executive Dir., Miss. State Employees’ Ret. 
Sys., to Inst. S’holder Servs. (2004)). 
 112. Id. (referencing statement issued by Colorado Public Employees’ Ret. Ass’n). 
 113. Id. (citing Cynthia Richson, Corporate Governance Officer, Ohio Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys.). 
 114. See, e.g., supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 115. INST. S’HOLDER SERVS., ISS 2007 U.S. PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES CONCISE SUMMARY 1 (2006), 
http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/2007%20USConciseSummaryGuidelines.pdf. ISS will also consider firm 
performance in proxy voting, even when the company has strong CGQ scores. ISS recently received criticism 
for its advice to reject Fifth Third Bank’s CEO, George A. Schaefer Jr., for reelection to the board: 
On Mar. 16, Richard X. Bove of investment bank Punk Ziegel & Co. fired off a research note 
calling ISS’ advice “totally inappropriate” and pointing out that Fifth Third’s assets have 
increased tenfold since Schaefer took over in 1990. Nell Minow, a former president of ISS who 
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however, that proxy advice is not necessarily based on a corporate governance rating, but 
common policies (unless otherwise specified by a client) will be applied to proxy advice 
and governance ratings. 
As the corporate governance industry has studied and advised various “best 
practices,” academics have been analyzing the relation between “best practices” advice 
and firm performance.  The question of whether corporate governance matters is often 
rhetorically posed—I suspect that virtually all scholars, investors, managers, and 
directors would agree that it matters at least with respect to endogenously selected 
practices and structures (although intuitively it seems likely that very poor corporate 
governance practices might correlate more reliably with substandard financial 
performance than compliance with best practices would correlate with superior 
performance). Professors Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Allen Ferrell, among others, 
have instead asked the following questions: What matters in corporate governance?116 
What are the appropriate structures and mechanisms of corporate governance for a given 
company?117 How should these structures and mechanisms be evaluated?118 Which 
structures and mechanisms are reliable indicators of good governance and superior firm 
performance (if any truly are), and which are not?119 While academic research on 
corporate governance is in relatively early stages, the research has produced helpful, if 
somewhat contradictory, results. 
Some corporate governance advisers are more susceptible to criticisms of their 
governance advice and ratings methodology because they rely primarily on quantitative 
methodologies (a kind of “check-the-box,” “one-size-fits-all” approach) to analyze 
subject companies. Such advisers are tied to a set of metrics, which, because they 
produce a binary and in some cases a trinary output (“yes,” “no,” or “not disclosed”), 
may not capture relevant nuances in corporate governance policies and behaviors. 
Further, to the extent that such metrics are held to apply to a wide range of companies, 
which may have an equally wide range of appropriate corporate governance structures 
and mechanisms, the metrics provide a limited and crude analytical tool. Corporate 
governance providers who rely on qualitative analyses, or a combination of quantitative 
and qualitative methodologies, on the other hand, may argue that while metrics provide a 
baseline, further qualitative evaluation allows the adviser to refine its analysis of a 
company’s corporate governance.  Whether such qualitative analysis is indeed superior to 
a quantitative approach will likely become more clear as ratings provided by each type of 
adviser are compared to actual results attributable to corporate governance actions and 
policies. Clearly, advisers who engage in qualitative analysis already believe that their 
 
now runs governance researcher The Corporate Library LLC, warns that ISS may create 
“incentive for earnings manipulation that may not be in the shareholders’ long-term interest” -- 
precisely the sort of activity good governance is supposed to prevent. 
Analysis & Commentary, ISS Looks Like It’s Channeling Icahn: The Proxy Advisory Firm Says Fifth Third's 
CEO Should Go Despite Stellar Governance, BUS. WEEK ONLINE, Apr. 3, 2006, 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_14/b3978031.htm?campaign_id=rss_magzn. 
 116. Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance? (Harvard Law Sch., John M. 
Olin Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 491, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=593423. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
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approach yields more accurate results (as evidenced, for example, by the Corporate 
Library’s mention of its low rating for Enron, despite Enron’s high rating based on purely 
quantitative factors).  
On the other hand, a review of recent finance literature suggests that a number of the 
governance metrics selected by ISS and GMI do not reliably predict firm performance. 
As used in this Article, the term “firm performance” is construed quite broadly, so that 
good firm performance may include not just superior returns on equity or assets, but 
whether the company is able to avoid problems that may be attributable to corporate 
governance failures, such as accounting restatements and lawsuits.120 
While the use of a set of one-size-fits-all governance criteria is obviously a concern 
with governance ratings, the problem is also apparent in the rather rigid review of various 
proxy proposals. For instance, ISS operates under the presumption that certain proposals 
should or should not be recommended—for example, there is a very strong presumption 
in favor of a proposal to alter company articles and bylaws to allow for annual election of 
directors.121 In order to rebut this presumption, management will spend a great deal of 
time and effort to make its case to ISS and institutional shareholders.122 While the annual 
election of directors arguably encourages director accountability, it also may jeopardize 
the interests of ISS’ core client base—large institutional investors. For instance, much of 
the activism by hedge funds appears to be event-driven rather than performance-
driven,123 and hedge funds may be hoping to effect a change of control (or at least 
sufficiently tip the balance) so as to cause an event that will inure to the benefit of the 
hedge funds, but that may be detrimental to many of the institutional investors. Annual 
election of directors will generally make it easier for a hedge fund or “pack” of hedge 
funds to gain the seats it needs to instigate the event. And, as Thomas Briggs has noted, 
“in contested board elections and other corporate disputes, ISS has become increasingly 
willing to support dissident candidates and positions,”124 and ISS support generally 
correlates with success of the dissident effort.125 
 
 120. Lynn Stout has argued that increasing share price is not the only (and not even the best) predictor of 
good firm performance. Lynn A. Stout, Share Price as a Poor Criterion for Good Corporate Law (Univ. of 
Cal., Los Angeles, Sch. of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 05-7, 2005), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=660622. 
 121. See INST. S’HOLDER SERVS., ISS 2006 U.S. PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES SUMMARY (2005), 
http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/US2006SummaryGuidelines.pdf (describing the procedure and substance ISS 
considers when voting). 
 122. See, e.g., Starkman, supra note 7 (describing management’s resistance to ISS). 
 123. See Audio file: Comments of Scott J. Davis at the 26th Annual Ray Garrett Jr. Corporate and 
Securities Law Institute, held by Northwestern University School of Law (May 4, 2006) (on file with author). 
 124. Briggs, supra note 11, at 14.   
 125. Id.  Similar results were found in a study by members of the SEC’s staff in a 2006 study.  The authors, 
which included the Chief Economist and Director of the SEC’s Office of Economic Analysis, concluded that 
“empirical evidence shows that the [proxy advisor] recommendations are good predictors of [proxy] contest 
outcomes; for example, a recommendation that supports the dissident is a good predictor that the dissident will 
prevail. The findings are associated with both ‘influence’ and ‘prediction’ hypotheses on the role of the advisor-
that the recommendation either influences or helps investors to predict the outcome, or both.”  Chester S. Spatt, 
Chief Economist and Director, Office of Economic Analysis, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech at Rutgers 
University Conference on “Improving Corporate Governance: Markets vs. Regulation:” Shareholder Voting and 
Corporate Governance: Economic Perspectives (April 20, 2007), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch042007css.htm (citing C. R. Alexander, M. Chen, D. Seppi and C. 
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Board independence, long a major focus of the corporate governance industry, is 
now required of larger public companies through NYSE and Nasdaq listing standards. 
Although the corporate governance industry and regulators have spoken definitively on 
the issue, board independence may not be a cure for governance failures. Indeed, recent 
research suggests that board independence may be negatively correlated with operating 
performance.126 Likewise, corporate governance industry firms have encouraged the 
separation of the CEO and chairman roles. While separating the roles does not guarantee 
avoiding poor governance (for example, Enron and WorldCom had separated these 
roles), it is also true that no study clearly indicates a correlation between firm 
performance and the duality of the CEO and the chairman.127 
Governance ratings firms and proxy advisory firms will naturally rely on certain 
rules of thumb to help evaluate corporate governance. My concern is not with rules of 
thumb, but rather, in the case of proxy advisory work, with what seem to be strong 
presumptions based on insufficient evidence, which must be vigorously rebutted by the 
company. In the case of governance ratings, however, often there is not merely a 
presumption but also a hard metric by which every company is judged. Professor Jeffrey 
Sonnenfeld has argued that the metrics used in the ratings analyses are based heavily on 
“Wall Street superstitions” and “clichés and myths, rather than on genuine research.”128 
The argument against ISS’ and GMI’s analysis is not that all or even most of the 
variables are inappropriate. Indeed, Sonnenfeld recognizes that some of the quantitative 
methodology employed by ISS and GMI relies on research-proven measures of effective 
governance. However, “ISS and GMI [then] blend these dimensions with superstitious 
ones to create checklists of highly stringent standards, regardless of the genuine research 
foundation to support them.”129 For example, Sonnenfeld argues that most of the studies 
that have been cited in support of the proposition that certain board structures correlate 
with effective governance, in fact, do not examine the impact of board structure but 
instead focus on other variables. Citing Sunil Wahal and Michael Smith, Sonnenfeld 
argues that those studies which attempt to isolate the impact of board structure on 
company performance have not found a strict correlation.130 Since Sonnenfeld’s article, 
some more recent studies do suggest some relation between board structure and corporate 
governance.131 Nonetheless, aside from particular governance requirements mandated by 
 
Spatt, The Role of Advisory Services in Proxy Voting (2006) (unpublished manuscript)). 
 126. SANJAI BHAGAT & BRIAN BOLTON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE (2006), 
http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/emplibrary/Corporate_Governance-Performance.pdf. Recent research by Professor 
William Sjostrom has also questioned the justifications for annual elections of directors. See William Sjostrom, 
The Case Against Mandatory Annual Director Elections and Shareholders’ Meetings, 74 TENN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ abstract=907474. 
 127. See, e.g., B. Ram Baliga et al., CEO Duality and Firm Performance: What’s the Fuss?, 17 STRATEGIC 
MGMT. J. 41 (1996); James A. Brickley et. al., Corporate Leadership Structure: On the Separation of the 
Positions of CEO and Chairman of the Board (Simon Sch. of Bus., Working Paper FR 95-02, 1995), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6124. 
 128. Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, Good Governance and the Misleading Myths of Bad Metrics, ACAD. MGMT. 
EXEC., Feb. 2004, at 108, 108. 
 129. Id. at 108-09. 
 130. Id. at 128, at 109 (citing Sunil Wahal, Pension Fund Activism and Firm Performance, 31 J. FIN. & 
QUANT. ANALYSIS 1 (1996) and Michael P. Smith, Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence 
from CalPERS, 51 J. FIN. 227 (1996)). 
 131. See Aggarwal & Williamson, supra note 72; David F. Larcker et al., How Important is Corporate 
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Sarbanes-Oxley, these studies do not investigate the effect of each component that might 
go into a construct of “board structure.” Current research suggests that while there is a 
correlation between some aspects of board structure and effective governance, it is 
unclear whether many other aspects of board structure are relevant to firm performance. 
For example, while the number of board members may be relevant in determining an 
effective corporate governance structure (e.g., three board members are too few, 
seventeen generally are too many), the number of board members who are independent, 
the number of board members who qualify as financial experts, or the number of public 
boards on which these directors serve may not be relevant. 
In a more recent study, Professors Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell analyzed the 
relationship between corporate governance provisions dealing with entrenchment and 
shareholder value. Bebchuk notes that much of the research on the effects of various 
governance structures examines one or more governance provisions in isolation, without 
controlling for the large universe of other governance provisions.132 For example, 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell note that a set of studies examining whether the adoption of 
a poison pill133 or a golden parachute134 affected stock prices did not properly take into 
account that “[w]hen a firm adopts a poison pill or a golden parachute . . . its stock price 
might be influenced not only by the expected effect of the poison pill or the golden 
parachute but also by inferences that investors make as to management’s private 
information about the likelihood of a bid.”135 Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell also note that 
“these studies did not control for whatever governance provisions the firms adopting the 
poison pill or golden parachute had.”136 
While Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell argue that governance structure matters, they 
also note that 
[A] “kitchen sink” approach of shareholder advisory firms might not be best. 
Among a large set of governance provisions, the provisions of real significance 
are likely to constitute only a limited and possibly small subset. Pressuring 
firms to improve their index could be counter-productive when the index gives 
weight to many innocuous or even beneficial provisions and correspondingly 
under-weights provisions that are in fact quite harmful to shareholders. And 
governance quality could well be measured more accurately by using a smaller 
index based on the provisions that do matter than by using a broader index that 
counts many provisions that do not in fact matter and only serve to introduce 
noise. Thus, investment decisions and governance improvements could be 
better served by an approach that seeks to identify and focus on key harmful 
 
Governance? (May 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=595821. 
 132. Bebchuk et al., supra note 116, at 13 (citing Jonathan M. Karpoff & Paul H. Malatesta, The Wealth 
Effects of Second-Generation State Takeover Legislation, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 291 (1989), and Mick Swartz, The 
Massachusetts Classified Board Law, 22 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 29 (1998)). 
 133. Id. at 14 (citing Michael Ryngaert, The Effect of Poison Pill Securities on Shareholder Wealth, 20 J. 
FIN. ECON. 377 (1988)). 
 134. Id. (citing Richard A. Lambert & David F. Larcker, Golden Parachutes, Executive Decision-Making, 
and Shareholder Wealth, 7 J. ACCT. & ECON. 179 (1985)). 
 135. Id. (citing John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the Scientific 
Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271 (2000)). 
 136. Id. 
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provisions rather than attempt to count all the trees in the governance forest.137 
To restate this conclusion a bit more bluntly, good governance analysis may not be 
so much a matter of examining whether a company adheres to a list of “best practices,” 
but might more profitably entail an examination of whether a firm is engaged in bad or 
“worst” practices. It is also worth noting that if Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell are right that 
fewer provisions matter, the value added by the corporate governance industry is reduced. 
If the information which most accurately reflects governance risk is less expensive to 
assemble and analyze, there should be a correspondingly decreased interest in 
outsourcing such research. 
Other recent research also calls into question much of the advice offered by 
corporate governance industry. A 2005 study by Professors Larcker, Richardson, and 
Tuna138 analyzed the effect on firm performance of a number of corporate governance 
indicators falling into “seven general categories: characteristics of the board of 
directors,139 stock ownership by executives and board members,140 stock ownership by 
institutions,141 stock ownership by activist holders,142 debt and preferred stock 
holdings,143 compensation mix variables,144 and anti-takeover devices.”145 
 
 137. Bebchuk et al., supra note 116, at 5. 
 138. Larcker et al., supra note 131. 
 139. Id. (manuscript at 6). Under each of these categories, respectively, Larcker et al. reviewed 
the number of meetings for the audit committee, compensation committee, and the total board . . . 
, number of directors serving on the compensation committee, audit committee, and the total 
board . . . , fraction of board comprised of insider (executive) directors . . . , fraction of the 
compensation committee and audit committee that is comprised of affiliated directors . . . , 
indicator variables equal to one if the chairperson of the compensation committee and audit 
committee is affiliated and zero otherwise . . . , the fraction of outside directors and affiliated 
directors that serve on four or more boards . . . , [and the fraction of inside directors that serve on 
two or more boards,] fraction of outside, affiliated, and inside directors that are older than 70 . . . , 
an indicator variable equal to one if there is a lead director (an outside director that can call 
meetings of all outside directors in executive session) on the board and zero otherwise . . . , an 
indicator variable equal to one if an internal executive holds the position of chairperson of the 
board and zero otherwise, and the fraction of affiliated and outside directors that were appointed 
by existing insiders . . . . 
Id. (manuscript at 6-7). 
 140. Id. (manuscript at 6). 
[Larcker et al.’s] board and executive ownership variables are the fraction of outstanding shares 
held by the average outside director . . . , fraction of outstanding shares held by the top executive . 
. . , fraction of outstanding shares held by the average executive director after excluding the 
holdings of the top executive . . . , and fraction of outstanding shares held by the average affiliated 
director . . . . 
Id. (manuscript at 8). 
 141. “Institutional ownership” is measured as the fraction of outstanding shares owned by block-holders, 
number of block-holders, and shareholding of the largest institutional owner. Larcker et al., supra note 131 
(manuscript at 8). 
 142. The “activist” variables are measured using the number of activist institutions holding shares and the 
fraction of outstanding shares held by activist institutions. Id. (manuscript at 9). 
 143. The role of debt as a governance mechanism is measured using the ratio of book value of debt 
(Compustat data item 9 plus data item 34) to the market value of equity (Compustat data item 199 multiplied by 
data item 25) and ratio of book value of preferred equity (Compustat data item 130) to the market value of 
equity (Compustat data item 199 multiplied by data item 25). Id. (collecting data from Standard & Poor’s, Data 
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In the study, Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna tried to combine the factors in different 
ways in order to test the significance of various governance structures. The authors of the 
study start with the proposition that governance matters; indeed Tuna states that: “[w]e 
set the study up to err on the side of, ‘The relationship [between governance measures 
and good performance] is there.’”146 However, Tuna notes: 
[W]e can’t even find it when we do that. We biased the analysis in favor of 
finding something . . . [but t]he structural indicators just don’t seem to have that 
much ability to explain whether companies have to do accounting restatements, 
whether they’re selling at a higher multiple, whether they’re manipulating 
earnings and things like that.147 
Discussing the study, Larcker observes that “[l]ots of people are coming up with 
governance scorecards. . . . They’re coming up with best practices and selling this stuff. 
As far as we can tell, there’s no evidence that those scorecards map into better corporate 
performance or better behavior by managers.”148 Generally speaking, good governance 
may affect firm performance, but it is not clear that the variables selected by governance 
ratings agencies are the appropriate metrics to test and promote good firm performance. 
The confusion over the appropriate variables is also underlined by Brown and 
Caylor in a 2005 study149 commissioned by ISS.150 Brown and Caylor created a measure 
of corporate governance, Gov-Score, based on an ISS dataset that covers 51 provisions or 
attributes falling into eight general categories:151 audit, board of directors, 
charter/bylaws, director education, executive and director compensation, ownership, 
progressive practices, and state of incorporation.152 Brown and Caylor then tested the 
Gov-Score attributes’ correlation with two measures of operating performance: return on 
equity and return on assets.153 Although their research indicates that that better governed 
firms are relatively more profitable, they also found that only ten governance provisions 
were significantly and positively related to operating performance,154 a finding that 
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supports the “noise” theory described by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell.155 Brown and 
Caylor’s research also supports Sonnenfeld’s contention that while some governance 
attributes are demonstrably relevant to firm performance, many others are perhaps 
inserted in governance indices because of Wall Street “myths” that such attributes are 
relevant. 
Sanjai Bhagat and Brian Bolton’s research on the relation of various measures of 
governance to firm performance indicates that “better governance as measured by Brown 
and Caylor, and the Corporate Library is not significantly correlated with better 
contemporaneous or subsequent operating performance.”156 They also find that board 
independence is negatively correlated with contemporaneous and subsequent operating 
performance; as they state, “This is especially relevant in light of the prominence that 
board independence has received in the recent NYSE and NASDAQ corporate 
governance listing requirements.”157 Perhaps most interestingly, Bhagat and Bolton find 
that director stock ownership is positively related to both future operating performance 
and to the probability of disciplinary management turnover in poorly performing firms. 
Bhagat and Bolton suggest that perhaps “a single board characteristic [might] be as 
effective a measure of corporate governance as indices that consider multiple measures of 
corporate charter provisions, management compensation structure, and board 
characteristics.”158 The fact that the Corporate Library’s measures, like the Brown and 
Caylor measures (which were based on ISS variables), were not a better predictor of firm 
performance suggests that even a more detailed, issuer-specific analysis of corporate 
governance still must rely on governance heuristics and, like ISS’ approach, may not 
systematically reveal marketable information with respect to firm performance. 
Finally, a study by N. K. Chidambaran, Darius Palia, and Yudan Zheng challenges 
the causal link on which much of the corporate governance industry is based: the 
connection between corporate governance changes and corporate performance.159 The 
authors note that a number of studies have found good governance measures to be 
positively correlated with firm performance, which has led to the assumption that the 
adoption of “good governance” measures will cause a firm’s performance to increase.160 
In constructing their study to analyze this assumption, Chidambaran, Palia, and Zheng 
 
directors; compensation committee comprised solely of independent outside directors; company not authorized 
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“‘stack the deck’ in support for the hypothesis that better governance leads to better firm 
performance.”161 Using a number of governance changes, including three measures 
based on the board of directors, five measures of pay-performance sensitivity, two 
measures of shareholder rights, institutional ownership, and CEO turnover, they find that 
measures thought to create better governance do not lead to better performance.162 The 
authors note that “[w]e do not interpret our findings that good governance does not lead 
to better performance to imply that governance is irrelevant but rather that firms are 
endogenously optimizing their governance structure in response to observable and 
unobservable firm characteristics,” noting, as Roberta Romano did in her critique of 
Sarbanes-Oxley, that “a blanket policy prescription that mandates specific governance 
provisions in all firms is not optimal.”163 
More specific research is justified by these results, and undoubtedly many 
academics are attempting to provide a clearer picture of the importance of corporate 
governance to firm performance. More research is needed on the particular variables used 
by ISS, GMI, and other governance ratings agencies, as well as the interrelationship and 
weighting of these variables in the creation of the final governance score.164 One very 
positive aspect of the corporate governance industry, however, is that because each 
adviser employs a different methodology to arrive at proxy and investment advice, 
scholars will also be able to continue to construct testable hypotheses on what might 
matter in corporate governance, and whether an “issue-by-company” approach such as 
that taken by Proxy Governance yields better returns than ISS’ advice, and if so, whether 
it overcomes any cost differences between the services. 
Another methodology concern, which is perhaps not limited to checklist governance 
raters, is a practice this Article will refer to as “methodology churn.” Corporate 
governance ratings firms continually update and retool their services, in part to remain 
competitive and be at the cutting edge of governance knowledge, but perhaps also 
because it is simply good business. Every time a new governance fashion appears, a 
governance ratings agency can retool and advertise the need for companies and 
shareholders to respond to the change. Methodology churn will ultimately sell more 
services, whether through additional governance advice, software access, or the purchase 
of reports. But why not wait until the knowledge of a particular governance structure 
becomes more certain before advocating say, majority voting for director elections? The 
answer may be simply that it does not make good business sense to wait for evidence to 
support governance claims when money can be made advocating them right now. 
Methodology churn and unproven governance metrics raise even more concerns when a 
firm, like ISS, is granted voting power by many clients. Perhaps a third or more of a 
company’s outstanding shares may be automatically voted in favor of fashionable or 
intuitively appealing yet unproven governance constructs in the form of a shareholder 
resolution. If another 20% of the shareholders agree with ISS’ assessment, the proposal 
has a majority. The board is not obligated to go along with the shareholders, but if the 
 
 161. Id. (manuscript at 43). 
 162. Id. (manuscript at 44). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Much of this latter research is dependent on the release of proprietary scoring models to researchers, 
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board does not, ISS may not support the directors in the following year’s election, based 
on their refusal to adopt a shareholder resolution approved by a majority of the 
shareholders. 
Despite the lack of strong evidence linking corporate governance to superior 
performance, the corporate governance industry continues to enjoy tremendous 
influence.165 What explains this? A large part of the explanation is that, as noted above, 
federal rules require pension funds and mutual funds to vote proxies in the best interests 
of their investors, and as fiduciaries these funds are compelled to perform due diligence 
with respect to proxy voting.166 This perhaps best explains the fact that ISS was 
purchased five years ago for $40 million and sold in November 2006 for $550 million.167 
Granted, funds may use the ratings services merely as one part of their overall 
governance analysis—they buy the report as part of a diligence process, but do not 
necessarily follow the advice.168 While that may be true for most institutions, however, 
that is not the case for the 15%-20% of ISS clients that have outsourced not only their 
governance analysis to a ratings firm, but also their proxy voting responsibilities. If up to 
a third of U.S. equities are indeed voted in accordance with ISS advice, we see another 
explanation for the corporate governance industry’s influence in the comments of 
Richard Koppes, former general counsel for the California Public Employees’ Retirement 
System (CalPERS): “an institution voting against the ISS recommendation better have a 
pretty good reason.”169 Following the advice of governance experts may provide 
“criticism insurance”170—a fund following ISS advice has no burden of proof with 
respect to a particular proxy vote. Further, it seems unlikely that a fund following the 
expert advice of ISS or another proxy adviser would be found to have breached its 
fiduciary duties. 
The uncertain relationship between governance metrics and firm performance may 
suggest that the project of reducing good governance to metrics is misguided. Indeed, it is 
telling that although the corporate governance industry has argued that good governance 
is related to superior firm performance, governance analysis is often outsourced. Perhaps 
many institutional investors outsource governance analysis and proxy analysis because 
they do not believe that significant gains could be realized by focusing on governance 
issues. Good governance, as measured through objective (and perhaps even subjective) 
analysis is bound to result in Type I errors (false positives) like Enron—companies with 
strong governance practices, according to the wisdom of corporate governance metrics, 
that still experience major governance breakdowns. On the other hand, governance 
analysis will certainly also result in Type II errors (false negatives), as companies with 
diligent and effective governance practices that do not meet the corporate governance 
industry’s recommendations are penalized for maintaining those practices. 
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C. The Homogenization of Corporate Governance 
As argued above, much of the rise of the governance industry is explained in part by 
tremendous inflow of investor dollars to institutional investors (e.g., through pensions 
and 401Ks). Although it is generally true that institutional investors and other governance 
services clients have more time and resources to evaluate companies than the individual 
investor (and, of course, are paid specifically for their expertise in such evaluation), 
institutional investors do not have an unlimited ability to conduct research, and so they 
outsource some of this research work to corporate governance advisers. This is not to say 
that institutional investors rely solely on the governance research provided by corporate 
governance advisers. However, it is probable that institutional investors are more likely to 
rely on corporate governance advisers when confronted by an unusual governance 
structure simply because they are less likely to possess, or willing to acquire, specialized 
knowledge needed to evaluate the structure. To the extent that fund managers defer some 
of the governance analysis to governance rating agencies (for example, if a fund manager 
decides that it will avoid companies with governance rating below a certain CGQ), a one-
size-fits-all approach will punish companies that adopt innovative governance structures. 
A one-size-fits-all model essentially standardizes corporate governance and discourages 
company-specific (or even industry-specific) governance policies and novel governance 
structures and standards.171 On the other hand, we can see how a case-by-case analysis 
might promote innovation (or at least not restrict it) by allowing governance raters like 
Proxy Governance to evaluate innovations and report on their value as governance 
devices. Again, however, although the “objective,” one-size-fits-all model may not 
provide a good analysis of a company’s corporate governance, the persistence of the 
model may lie in the fact that the use of objective criteria may help eliminate, or at least 
lessen, the appearance of potential conflicts of interest where these firms serve both 
investors and the company. 
While rigid governance metrics may result in an inaccurate assessment of a firm’s 
governance, the influence of the corporate governance industry generates a more general, 
market-wide concern: the imposition of governance metrics serves to standardize 
governance structures and compels a rigid set of acceptable practices in a context where 
flexibility should be a goal. Such a concern has been made with respect to the 
federalization of corporate law through the encroachment of Sarbanes-Oxley, but it is 
also relevant here. As former Delaware Chief Justice Norm Veasey has argued, Sarbanes-
Oxley 
does not account for the complexities of the corporate environment. Rather than 
setting broad standards and allowing public companies some leeway in 
determining how best to comply with those standards, Sarbanes-Oxley 
“prescribe[s] the precise means by which directors and officers are to pursue 
certain ends.” Delaware fiduciary law, by contrast, promotes good governance 
practices while “recogniz[ing] that what generally works for most boards may 
not be the best method for some others.” Delaware’s approach, which relies on 
 
 171. “Innovative” may thus be another way of saying “different”; a company may not be attempting a new 
kind of governance model, but may be retaining an older practice that has worked well for the company in the 
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the courts to define what is required of officers and directors on a case-by-case 
basis, ensures that firms can select the appropriate governance regime for their 
situation. This flexibility, so vital to maintaining a sensible, effective regulatory 
regime for corporate governance, is largely absent from Sarbanes-Oxley.172 
The same may be said for the mandates of many firms in the corporate governance 
industry. An inflexible, standardized governance checklist used to determine whether a 
company is appropriately governed or whether shareholders should approve a particular 
proposal will invariably fail to adequately analyze the governance structure or proposal, 
and will also serve to stifle potentially beneficial governance innovations. The 
overwhelming market power of ISS underscores this concern. Because corporate 
governance ratings firms play a significant role in directing corporate governance 
discourse, both through ratings and through proxy advisory work, it is worth considering 
whether public company management is effectively being deprived of some essential 
latitude in how it may manage the company. The result of a strict set of governance 
guidelines, upon which a company’s rating depends, is that the company may be less 
likely to consider innovative governance structures (unless, of course, the governance 
structure is the structure du jour advocated by the governance industry). It is also worth 
noting Delaware Vice Chancellor Leo Strine’s concern that “unlike the individual 
investors whose capital they use to wield influence, institutional investors and their 
[proxy] advisers bear far less of the residual risk of poor voting decisions, as their 
compensation turns more on short-term factors than long-run growth.”173 
Recent empirical evidence also suggests that one-size-fits-all governance will 
generally produce lower returns than a flexible approach that allows corporations to 
deviate from “best practices.” Sridhar Arcot and Valentina Bruno of the London School 
of Economics analyzed the effect of corporate governance on performance in the context 
of the United Kingdom’s disclose-or-explain corporate governance structure (under this 
approach, compliance with a code of best practices is voluntary, but companies must 
disclose whether they are complying with the code, and if not, explain why).174 The 
authors found that “companies departing from best practice for valid reasons perform 
exceptionally well and out-perform the fully-compliant ones. In contrast, mere 
compliance with the provisions of the Code does not necessarily result in better 
performance.”175 The authors also noted: 
An index which identifies better governed companies by analyzing adherence 
to governance provision(s) discards relevant information and imposes a one-
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size-fits-all [approach] framework on what is expected from companies. . . . 
Not recognizing the . . . heterogeneity among firms by . . . imposing one-size-
fits-all approaches would raise efficiency issues. Indeed, there are many 
arguments for and against each regulatory proposal, recommendation or 
governance criteria.176 
Arcot and Bruno’s research suggests that the mandatory provisions of Sarbanes-
Oxley and related SEC rulemaking (such as the implementation of internal controls under 
section 404) may create inefficiencies by eliminating heterogeneity among firms’ 
governance structures. However, these same concerns run to the check-the-box 
governance criteria of ISS and GMI to the extent that their criteria operate like mandatory 
regulations. While it is certain that ISS’ governance criteria are not enforceable by SEC 
or other governmental sanction, the significant voting power under ISS’ control and the 
influence of ISS with institutional investors may nonetheless compel compliance, thereby 
creating a more homogenous corporate population. International competitors of U.S. 
companies, by contrast, generally operate under disclose-or-explain governance regimes 
such as the United Kingdom’s, “where companies can make different governance choices 
reflecting their unique circumstances.”177 
Despite the potential for homogenization, a potentially positive effect from the 
perspective of management discipline may come from the efforts of the corporate 
governance industry (among others) against anti-takeover protections: the success of the 
efforts may invigorate the market for corporate control. Indeed, these efforts may be a 
significant cause of the recent heavy merger activity in the United States.178 
IV. REGULATION OF THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDUSTRY: PRELIMINARY 
CONSIDERATIONS 
Ironically, the efforts of the corporate governance industry to fill (and profit from) a 
regulatory void raise the question of whether the governance industry itself should be 
regulated, with the SEC the most likely regulator. This Article attempts to outline several 
problems which might justify regulation. 
However, with the possible exception of conflicts of interest (which, for this reason, 
receives the most attention), I believe that these problems would not be solved, and may 
even be exacerbated, by SEC regulation. The following sections outline some preliminary 
thoughts on the regulation of conflicts, methodology concerns, and the homogenization 
of corporate law.179 
A. Conflicts 
As noted above, various state pension funds have responded to perceived conflicts 
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of interest within ISS by migrating to other proxy advisers.180 Aside from market 
pressure, existing SEC rules under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Advisers 
Act”), and particularly through proxy voting regulations passed in 2003, also provide 
some conflicts prevention for governance raters that are also doing proxy advisory 
work.181 Under the Advisers Act, proxy advisers have a fiduciary duty of care to vote 
proxies in the clients’ best interests.182 The 2003 regulations: 
Require . . . investment adviser[s] that exercise . . . voting authority over client 
proxies to adopt policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that the 
adviser votes proxies in the best interests of clients, to disclose to clients 
information about those policies and procedures, and to disclose to clients how 
they may obtain information on how the adviser has voted their proxies.183 
Note, however, that the rules apply specifically to proxy voting and would not be 
appropriate to governance advisory work generally because of the lack of any statutory 
duty of care. The potential conflicts of interest created by governance marketers 
simultaneously providing governance ratings advice to companies and their investors are 
not covered under any existing or proposed SEC rules. 
The SEC does not specify specific policies for advisers to insure that they will vote 
in the best interests of clients; nor does the SEC provide a list of approved procedures 
because it believes that “[i]nvestment advisers registered with [the SEC] are so varied 
that a one-size-fits-all approach is unworkable. By not mandating specific policies and 
procedures, [the SEC] leaves advisers the flexibility to craft policies and procedures 
suitable to their businesses and the nature of the conflicts they face.”184 ISS, for example, 
has put in place a “firewall” similar to the kind of structural protections used by banks to 
keep separate the research and investment banking units.185 In a no-action request letter 
to the Division of Investment Management, ISS describes the firewall, noting, among 
other things, that the “firewall involves functional, physical, and technological 
separations.”186 The management and staff of the research departments that analyze 
proxies and formulate voting recommendations are “completely different from the 
management and staff of the Corporate Programs division who supply the web-based 
tools and publications to corporate clients and provide advice in connection 
therewith.”187 The research staff and corporate programs staff operate out of separate and 
secure areas at ISS’ headquarters, and they maintain separate and secure office equipment 
and information databases. It appears that the research staff has no way of knowing 
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whether clients purchase advisory services, since “both the Corporate Programs staff and 
the sales staff for the corporate products have been trained in the requirement to keep the 
identities of the issuer clients confidential, and they communicate with those clients in a 
secure fashion.”188 ISS has also instituted a “blackout” policy, so that the advisory 
division may not provide any advisory services to issuers or access to the web-based tools 
from the time a definitive proxy statement is filed and until the date of the issuer’s 
shareholders’ meeting.189 Since the no-action request, ISS has attempted to further 
separate its investor and corporate advisory businesses by creating a stand-alone 
subsidiary called ISS Corporate Services.190 
ISS also believes that the publication of its Proxy Voting Manual helps protect 
against conflicts by making clear its position on various issues so that “each individual 
proxy analysis and voting recommendation is made on an objective basis.”191 Again, 
however, this raises the concerns created by a one-size-fits-all approach, which is perhaps 
necessitated by a need to appear objective. Further, these policies will incorporate the 
same errors as the corporate governance ratings, especially since the proxy advisory arm 
of ISS generally relies on the same policy constructs as ISS’ governance ratings business. 
Several points are worth noting in connection with the Division of Investment 
Management’s response to the no-action request letter. First, the Division of Investment 
Management does not specifically grant no-action relief to ISS, noting that: 
In your letter, you specifically request no-action relief under rule 206(4)-6 
under the Advisers Act. That rule addresses the adoption, implementation and 
disclosure of proxy voting procedures that are reasonably designed to ensure 
that investment advisers vote client proxies in their clients’ best interests. You 
do not, however, request relief from any requirement of the rule. Consequently, 
we will not respond to your request for no-action relief under the rule.192 
Second, like all SEC no-action letters, the SEC makes clear that it does not 
specifically approve of the ISS firewall, stating that it “take[s] no position . . . regarding 
whether ISS’ conflict procedures . . . effectively ensure that its proxy voting 
recommendations to investment advisers are impartial.”193 Finally, the Division of 
Investment Management represents just one potential regulator within the SEC itself. The 
Division of Corporation Finance, which oversees proxy and shareholder proposal review 
and generally covers proxy policymaking, has stepped in to provide rules designed to 
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limit auditor and analyst conflicts of interest and could design rules relating to proxy 
advisers. It is possible that the Division of Corporation Finance would take a different 
view of ISS’ potential conflicts than the Division of Investment Management and, given 
its history with such rulemaking, it seems less likely that ISS’ procedures would merit a 
no-action letter from the Division of Corporation Finance. In sum, the Division of 
Corporation Finance is under no obligation to refrain from regulating the corporate 
governance industry nor from referring a conflicts matter to the SEC’s Division of 
Enforcement if it perceives a problem with the industry’s activities.194 
Other conflicts prevention rules, developed to address analyst conflicts of interest, 
provide models that may be more applicable to governance rating than the proxy voting 
rules. Regulation AC, which deals with analyst conflicts, addresses these concerns 
through a certification procedure. The certification requirement applies to “brokers, 
dealers, and their associated persons that are ‘covered persons’ that publish, circulate, or 
provide research reports.”195 The regulation requires analysts to certify that “the views 
expressed in the research report accurately reflect such research analyst’s personal views 
about the subject securities and issuers,” and also 
(1) that no part of his or her compensation was, is, or will be directly or 
indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views contained in the 
research report; or (2) that part or all of his or her compensation was, is, or will 
be directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views 
contained in the research report. If the analyst’s compensation was, is, or will 
be directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views 
contained in the research report, the statement must include the source, amount, 
and purpose of such compensation, and further disclose that it may influence 
the recommendation in the research report.196 
As a conflicts prevention device, a certification procedure may be appropriate for 
governance ratings agencies, and would perhaps be welcomed by the corporate 
governance industry because it would enhance the credibility of internal conflicts 
prevention controls. Like Regulation AC, such a rule could require a certification that the 
analyst’s compensation is not tied to the specific recommendations or views contained in 
the research report, and if the analyst’s compensation is tied to specific recommendations 
or views, the certification should disclose the source, amount, and purpose of such 
compensation. A firm that uses quantitative methodology could argue that no conflict is 
possible given the objective nature of the analysis (there really are no analysts for 
governance ratings—just persons who collect data then input them into a model, without 
any opportunity to benefit from the analysis). However, the SEC considered but did not 
 
 194. Although the Division of Corporation Finance almost certainly would consult with the Division of 
Investment Management (IM) on the issue, the fact that IM did not grant specific no-action relief seems to leave 
the issue open to the Division of Corporation Finance. However, because ISS falls under IM’s purview as a 
consultant to investment advisers, the Division of Corporation Finance may be deferential to IM’s decision, 
although neither the Division of Corporation Finance nor the Division of Enforcement would be bound by IM’s 
letter. 
 195. Letter from Mari Anne Pisarri, supra note 186, at n.2. 
 196. Regulation Analyst Certification, Securities Act Release No. 8193, Exchange Act Release No. 47,384, 
68 Fed. Reg. 9841 (Apr. 14, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8193.htm. 
 DRAFT OF 7/19/2007 
2007] The Corporate Governance Industry 137 
accept that argument with respect to Regulation AC.197 The SEC noted in the final rule 
release that if there is no identified analyst because the report is based on the firm’s 
quantitative or technical model: 
the firm itself may provide the certifications that the views expressed in the 
research report accurately reflect the firm’s quantitative research model, and 
that no part of the firm’s compensation was, is, or will be, directly or indirectly, 
related to the specific recommendations or views disclosed in the research 
report.198 
The SEC also noted the possibility that a model could be skewed to favor certain 
companies: 
tying an analyst’s [or a firm’s] compensation to the performance of a 
quantitative or technical model would indicate that the report is the product of 
the analyst’s subjective views (reflected by the design of the model employed). 
In that case, that analyst must certify the report containing the model’s results 
in accordance with . . . Regulation AC.199 
In the case of a governance ratings agency that also provides governance advisory 
services, the agency would likely create a “firewall” (as ISS has apparently done) in order 
to eliminate the possibility of a violation. The principal benefits of this form of regulation 
are that it allows the ratings firm to craft its own policies while encouraging sound 
conflicts prevention policies, and it provides the SEC a direct means to enforce 
governance ratings firms’ conflicts. Also, if this Article’s hypothesis that the perception 
of a conflict of interest may exacerbate methodology problems (firms worried about 
conflicts will use a more objective but less accurate “one-size-fits-all” methodology) is 
correct, a rule that certifies that there are no conflicts may relieve some of the pressure on 
these firms to stick with such a methodology, encouraging them to opt instead for a more 
flexible, case-by-case analysis. 
Despite these benefits, however, it is worth considering whether governance ratings 
firms, in response to market pressures, will effectively self-regulate with respect to 
conflicts. For example, because of rules requiring proxy voting firms to vote in a client’s 
best interest, some firms, such as ISS, have put in place sophisticated conflicts prevention 
procedures that should also prevent conflicts between governance ratings and governance 
advisory work. Other firms will also have basic competitive incentives to avoid 
conflicts—most importantly, their credibility as ratings firms may be jeopardized by the 
appearance of conflicts. A number of pension funds have migrated away from ISS, 
despite its conflicts prevention rules, because ISS suffers from the perception (although 
perhaps not the reality) of conflicts of interest.200 If ISS continues to lose business, it 
may be pressured to strengthen the wall between its consulting business and its proxy 
advisory/governance ratings businesses. However, it is not clear how ISS could do this 
since, as noted above, ISS has created a stand-alone subsidiary for corporate advisory 
services and has separated the physical and technological operations of the potentially 
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conflicting business units. But in any case, what may be at the root of the pension funds’ 
concern is not the potential for conflicts per se, but the fact that ISS gives advice to 
companies at all, even if ISS only has the benign intention of enabling companies to 
improve their governance. Would ISS accept an unassailable conflicts prevention 
device—the sale of its corporate consulting businesses? The selling point of ISS’ 
consulting service is that it can tell issuers exactly what they need to do in order to 
receive a good governance rating or approval for a compensation plan, so it is unlikely 
that ISS’ consulting business could be as successful as a completely independent 
enterprise. 
Another justification for allowing corporate governance raters to self-regulate is that 
SEC regulation of the industry may actually increase the market power of the few major 
corporate governance players. As Jonathan Macey has argued in the context of 
derivatives regulation (a much more competitive industry than governance ratings, at 
least in terms of the number of significant market participants), the fixed costs associated 
with regulation would serve as barriers to entry of new competitors in the market.201 This 
would be an especially unfortunate side-effect in a market that is already dominated by a 
single firm which competes with only a handful of others. 
B. Methodology Concerns 
While there are good reasons why SEC regulation of conflicts of interest within 
corporate governance firms may not be ideal, the case for SEC regulation of methodology 
problems is even more tenuous. In the context of proxy advice, the Investment Advisers 
Act rule requiring advisers to vote in the shareholders’ best interest may provide some 
general protection against outrageous methodological flaws. However, the more 
fundamental methodology concerns outlined above, which are perhaps more significant 
in governance ratings work than proxy advisory work, would be extremely difficult for 
the SEC to regulate.202 This is especially so given that the basic premise of methodology 
regulation seems functionally equivalent to merit regulation, which is not part of the 
SEC’s regulation program (the only area of SEC regulation that has come close is the 
SEC review of shareholder proposals that companies wish to exclude under Rule 14a-
8).203 Without a direct mandate from Congress, the SEC could only regulate 
methodology through disclosure and related antifraud rules. It is unlikely that the precise 
methodology would be disclosed, however. In order to protect trade secrets, the SEC does 
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not require such disclosure under its new rules for credit rating agencies (CRAs),204 and 
it is unlikely that such disclosure would be required from governance raters. Instead of 
requiring methodology disclosure, however, perhaps the SEC could require a certification 
from the governance ratings firm that the rating represents the governance raters “true 
belief,” as with research analyst certification.205 Similar to the rules now applicable to 
credit ratings agencies, the SEC could also mandate that the governance ratings firms use 
systematic procedures “designed to ensure credible and reliable ratings, manage potential 
conflicts of interest, and prevent the misuse of nonpublic information, and [have] 
sufficient financial resources to ensure compliance with those procedures.”206 To protect 
trade secrets, merely requiring a basic description of the methodology, without requiring 
discussion of the weighting methodology, might be appropriate. However, the ratings 
firms already do this to some degree (at least those that rely on a one-size-fits-all 
approach), so the market is able to analyze whether such a method would work. 
For these reasons, the best protection against methodology concerns may be simply 
heightened scrutiny by researchers, which will hopefully increase institutional investors’ 
awareness of the flaws in proxy vote recommendations and governance ratings 
methodology. As discussed above, some governance metrics correspond to measurable 
improvements in firm performance while some do not, even though they have generally 
been thought to correlate with good firm performance.207 Further, if ratings accuracy is to 
be a serious consideration, the complexity of the variables involved may ultimately 
preclude broadly applicable objectives measures. One might imagine that while certain 
governance criteria matter, they may only be important if other governance structures are 
present, or if a company is of a certain size, has a certain shareholder composition, or is at 
a certain stage of its life-cycle. Figuring out what matters, and what does not, all within a 
regulatory environment that is perpetually unstable (whether under Delaware decisions, 
new SEC rules, or exchange listing standard changes), will no doubt be an elusive goal. 
C. The Homogenization of Corporate Law 
The homogenization of corporate law is directly related to issues of methodology. I 
readily acknowledge that it is reasonable to restrict management activities in situations 
where we know such activities would damage a company. Professor Bebchuk and his 
colleagues, for example, have spent a great deal of effort arguing that certain anti-
takeover structures damage companies, and he has produced evidence to demonstrate 
how that is so.208 Accepting their research, we might agree that a company that institutes 
such poison pill structures (especially in combination with other structures such as a 
classified board) should receive a lower governance rating. Even in this scenario, 
however, we should be careful about applying general prohibitions—in some cases, such 
a structure might be consistent with shareholder interests if, as some argue, pills are used 
to increase an acquisition price. On the other hand, even where there is no such evidence 
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that a particular structure is undesirable, the fact that a governance ratings agency 
believes it to be may impede management from adopting it. 
Again, I believe this concern is best addressed through the force of continued 
research. If research suggests that a particular “bad” governance structure does not 
negatively affect firm value (or perhaps is even shown to positively affect firm value), 
governance ratings agencies should cease penalizing it. If they do not, hopefully investors 
will discipline the ratings agency by moving to a competitor, or, in the case of proxy 
advice, will simply not follow the recommendation. However, this depends on the ability 
of the investors to recognize when ratings agencies are not in step with the research. It is 
not certain that institutional investors will see significant value in exploiting such 
inefficiencies. 
One area in which the SEC could act is in clarifying fiduciary responsibilities with 
respect to proxy voting. The SEC’s proxy voting rules have played a major role in the 
recent growth of the corporate governance industry. If the goal of the new proxy voting 
rules was to produce more dedicated oversight by fund managers, the regulation has the 
opposite effect: rather than more oversight, firms now outsource. The SEC could clarify 
its rules, however, to make clear that merely following the advice of a corporate 
governance adviser will not establish due care with respect to proxy voting. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The goal of this Article is to encourage academic interest in the corporate 
governance industry and its methodology, and to encourage debate on whether and how it 
should be monitored or regulated. The corporate governance industry in general plays a 
very significant role in capital allocation by collecting governance information and 
identifying poor performers. ISS and its competitors are also helping shareholders gain 
power209 by providing a more unified voice, and may be (perhaps inadvertently) 
invigorating the market for corporate control. However, this Article offers several reasons 
why investors should be skeptical of the reliability of some of their recommendations. 
Although the SEC may help in this respect by more closely monitoring potential conflicts 
of interest within the corporate governance industry, SEC regulation of methodology 
concerns does not fall within the SEC’s traditional scope of regulation and is outside the 
SEC’s expertise. 
Even if we accept that further SEC regulation of corporate governance is unlikely to 
help, the problems reducing the effectiveness of the corporate governance industry are 
not insurmountable. Increased competition in the industry may help discipline some of 
the problematic activity, especially if the competition comes from governance ratings 
agencies and proxy advisers that do not rely on unproven governance metrics and do not 
adopt a “one-size-fits-all” methodology. Further, there is already some evidence that 
investors will punish companies whose practices seem to be in actual or potential conflict 
with the investors’ interests. Finally, continued academic interest by finance scholars and 
increased interest by legal scholars will also help clients of the corporate governance 
industry by testing whether the rules and standards proposed by the industry are 
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appropriate and supported by reliable evidence. 
 
